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The New York City Criminal Court (the Criminal Court) is the busiest
criminal court in the world.' It operates in all five city boroughs and serves
as the administrative starting point for nearly all criminal cases, including
felonies, misdemeanors, and violations.2 In theory, the New York Supreme
Court handles felony cases, and the Criminal Court hears misdemeanors.3 In
fact, however, crime levels in New York City have reached such levels that
over fifty percent of all felony arrests are reduced by the prosecutor to misde-
meanors so that they may be addressed in the Criminal Court,4 Thus, as the
processing of these felony-type crimes has been accommodated in the Criminal
Court, many low-level quality-of-life crimes have been bumped out of the
system for lack of time, space, and resources. In Manhattan, the quality-of-life
crimes comprise five general categories: prostitution, subway fare-beating,
minor drug offenses, unlicensed street peddling, and petit larceny/criminal
possession of stolen property.
Given the limited resources of the state and the high levels of crime in New
York City, state and local law enforcement efforts are concentrated on major
violent crimes, such as rape, murder, and armed robbery.5 But violent crimes
constitute less than twenty-five percent of all crimes committed in New York
City; most crimes are nonviolent.6 Thus, it appears to the casual observer that
many quality-of-life crimes go substantially unnoticed by law enforcement
officials. Although quality-of-life offenses victimize communities, they are
often "played down in the welter of violent felonies." 7 Quality-of-life offenses
are the crimes that affect the city's population most; indeed, they profoundly
influence citizens' sense of safety in their neighborhoods. 8 Recently, the public
t A special thank you to John P. McCormick for his talented editing and comments.
1. STATE OF N.Y., DEP'T OF STATE, LOCAL Gov. HANDBOOK 38 (4th ed. 1987).
2. Harry I. Subin, The New York City Criminal Court: The Case for Abolition 1 (Occasional Papers,
Center for Research in Crime and Justice No. XII, 1992).
3. Generally, felony arrests are transferred to the New York Supreme Court after the bail determination
is made in the Criminal Court. In a number of boroughs, some felonies are retained by the Criminal Court
and later disposed of in special parts. Written Comments from Michael Smith, Vera Institute of Justice,
to Linda M. Ricci 1 (Nov. 15, 1993) (on file with author).
4. Subin, supra note 2, at 4.
5. Interview with Judge Robert G.M. Keating, Administrative Judge of the New York City Criminal
Court, in New York, N.Y. (Feb. 1, 1993).
6. NEW YORK POLICE DEP'T, POLICING NEW YORK CITY IN THE 1990S 13 (1991) [hereinafter
POLICING NEW YORK CITY].
7. Ralph Blumenthal, Real-Life Courtroom Drama May Play on Broadway Stage, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov.
15, 1991, at Al.
8. POLICING NEW YORK CITY, supra note 6, at 13.
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and the police have begun to question the seeming lack of adequate attention
given to these offenses.9
On October 12, 1993, a new structure for the processing of quality-of-life
crimes opened its doors at 314 West 54th Street."0 This structure is more than
just a new or additional facility; it represents an effort for meaningful change
in the state criminal justice system. The culmination of over two years'
planning, the Midtown Community Court (the Community Court) is unique
in the United States and has jurisdiction over quality-of-life crimes committed
in the Times Square Area of Manhattan." Approximately thirty-six percent
of misdemeanor arrests in New York City occur in this area. 2 The court's
innovative approach strives for swift justice and productive alternatives in
sentencing. The court's goal, as defined by its founders, is "to make justice
more productive and visible to the affected community by addressing quality-
of-life crimes in a setting where community concerns can be heard and individ-
ualized sanctions can be developed that benefit the community, the victim, and
the defendant."13
The Midtown Community Court is an official branch of the Criminal
Court, 4 yet it is not a court in the traditional sense. The Community Court
houses arraignments only, and, in this respect, it substantially replaces the
Criminal Court in the processing of misdemeanor arrests made in the Times
Square Area. Offenders-five card Monte players, illegal peddlers, prostitutes,
turnstile jumpers, purse snatchers, and other misdemeanants-are arraigned
and sentenced at the Community Court.'5 The Community Court represents
9. The "first task" of Mayor Rudolph Giuliani and Police Commissioner William Bratton is "to reclaim
the streets" by paying more attention to "quality-of-life intrusions." A Broad Plan for Safe Streets, N.Y.
TIMEs, Dec. 7, 1993, at A26. This designation of the Mayor's task recognizes the fact that although "[miost
serious crimes dropped" during the past few years, "people have not felt safer." Id.
10. Telephone Interview with John Feinblatt, Coordinator, Midtown Community Court (Dec. 1, 1993).
11. As used in this Note, the term "Times Square Area" refers to the area between 29th Street and
59th Street, from Lexington Avenue to Hudson Avenue. Id.
12. This figure is for the area covered by Midtown Precincts North and South. Telephone Interview
with John Feinblatt, supra note 10; interview with Gerald Shoenfeld, Chairman of the Shubert Organization,
and Herb Sturz, former Deputy Mayor for Criminal Justice, in New York, N.Y. (Feb. 11, 1993). The
Midtown North and South Precincts encompass an area highly affected by quality-of-life crimes. Indicative
of the area's character, the Midtown South Precinct is commonly described as "the diseased precinct of
the universe." Telephone Interview with John Williams, Operations Coordinator, Midtown Community
Court (Dec. 3, 1992).
13. Midtown Community Court Project, Community Court Project (Apr. 2, 1992) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Community Court Project].
14. Midtown Community Court Project, The Midtown Community Court (1992) (on file with author).




petit larceny & criminal possession 16%
of stolen property
unlicensed vending 9%
minor drug offenses 9%
Community Court Project, supra note 13, at 15.
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a dramatic break, both in philosophy and practice, from the "turnstile" justice
that abounds in the New York City Criminal Court. In the Criminal Court,
the processing of quality-of-life crimes has been characterized by many as
routine, impersonal, and, ultimately, ineffective. As one commentator noted:
In what is a ritual that every one of the participants knows by rote, the suspect
is picked up by police, booked at the local station house, taken to police headquar-
ters downtown ... fingerprinted there, put in a cell overnight, taken to arraign-
ment court the next day, where the case is usually disposed of at the bench within
three minutes, and then released. Time served, they call it. The court frees the
suspect back to the streets without knowing any more about him or her than when
the person entered the courthouse. 6
In seeking to overcome these failings, the Community Court has introduced
substantive and procedural changes in the present system.
This Note explores the workings of the Midtown Community Court and
considers its application to unlicensed street vending. Unlicensed vending is
generally, although not perfectly, representative of the quality-of-life crimes
processed by the Community Court. This crime is especially amenable to study
because it varies little among offenders and occurs in high volume. Although
unlicensed vending is neither a violent nor dangerous crime, it presents real
problems to the people and the city. Unlicensed vendors pose safety, health,
and economic threats to members of the public and to private businesses. The
system is still grappling with how best to handle this particular group of
offenders, and relatively little academic research has been done on high-
volume, low-profile misdemeanors.
To assess the Community Court's significance in the larger system, this
Note uses unlicensed vending as the lens through which to observe and under-
stand the court's innovations. Part I is investigative in nature and brings to
light many relevant facts and circumstances surrounding unlicensed street
vending in New York City. Part II follows a vending offender through the
traditional criminal justice system from arrest to release. Part III discusses the
workings of the Community Court and its design for change. Finally, Part IV
illuminates some of the most important issues presented by the Community
Court, with specific reference to the plight of unlicensed vendors.
I. STREET VENDING IN NEW YORK CITY
Street vendors are present in many parts of New York City. In midtown
Manhattan, where the problem is particularly acute, it is nearly impossible to
16. Marcia Chambers, NAT'L L.J., July 5, 1993 (hi-weekly column), at 15.
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walk a single block without observing tables of merchandise for sale on the
sidewalk. The merchandise ranges from umbrellas and toys to counterfeit
Gucci bags and Rolex watches. Nearly everything found in nearby stores is
also for sale on the sidewalk. Some peddlers have elaborate tables piled high
with a variety of items; other, more mobile entrepreneurs carry only a small
suitcase of merchandise. In contrast to most stores, however, bargains may
be struck, and there are no regular opening or closing hours. The vendors are
here to sell as long as business is good. Consumers are tourists, regular
customers, browsers, and one-time buyers alike. Even on the coldest and
rainiest of days, the streets are lined with vendors.
There are four general categories of city peddlers: (1) food vendors, (2)
vendors of written materials, (3) disabled veterans, and (4) general merchan-
dise vendors. Each type of vendor is subject to a different regulatory scheme,
and law enforcement officials consequently deal with them differently. Food
vendors present relatively few problems for law enforcement officials, because
most of them are licensed.17 Vendors of written materials hold a special
status, because they cannot be prosecuted due to First Amendment consider-
ations. " Disabled veterans have a complicated history and recently have been
the subject of special judicial and legislative attention.' 9 Compared with the
17. Interview with Officer Adam D'Amico, New York Police Department, Midtown Precinct South,
in New York, N.Y. (Dec. 15, 1992). Among the various types of street vendors, food vendors are
commonly characterized as the "good vendors." Vendors: Good, Bad and Good-Bad, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
1, 1986, at A20. The Department of Health licenses and regulates food vendors, and it currently restricts
the number of food vending licenses to 3000. TASK FORCE ON GEN. VENDORS, DEP'T OF CONSUMER
AFFAIRS, NEW YORK, N.Y., BALANCING SAFETY AND SALES ON CITY STREETS 8 n.1 (Feb. 1991).
18. Book vendors, often referred to as "general vendors with an exemption," retain a special status
among vendors because they are exempt from the licensing requirement. The selling of printed material,
as the dissemination of information, is considered a constitutionally protected activity under the First
Amendment, and the book vendor exemption in the New York City Administrative Code embraces this
notion. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE §§ 20-453, -473 (1985 & Supp. 1993). The exemption has been
pushed to its limits-even calendars and baseball cards fall within the provision. Interview with William
H. Daly, Director, Office of Midtown Enforcement, in New York, N.Y. (Dec. 15, 1992). The curbside
book business is quite profitable, with individual vendor book sales producing gross revenues of $250 to
$300 per day. Interview with Lt. J.J. Johnson, Commanding Officer, PBMS Peddler Task Force, in New
York, N.Y. (Nov. 17, 1992). However, this business has been described as an organized hierarchy of
vendors, id., for many of these vendors are employees themselves, keeping only $40 of the day's profits.
Richard Levine, On the Sidewalks, Business is Booming, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1990, at B 1; see Disabled
Vets Gone, But Peddlers Abound, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 1992, at A22. Vendors of written materials pose
relatively few problems for law enforcement officials, and these vendors are usually cited only for technical
violations concerning length, width, and height of selling tables.
19. Disabled veterans are licensed outside of the regular scheme, and, unlike other general vendors,
they pay no annual fee and are not subject to the 853-general-vendor cap. Telephone Interview with Henry
Valley, Department of Consumer Affairs (Mar. 22, 1993). At present there are several hundred licenses
issued to disabled veterans, bringing the total number of issued general-vendor licenses to approximately
1200. Levine, supra note 18; see Mixed Reviews on 5th Ave. to Veterans' Peddling Curb, N.Y. TIMES,
July 4, 1991, at B3.
During the past decade, the plight of disabled veterans in the peddling industry has stirred an ongoing
and heated debate. Until July 1991, a state law enacted in 1894 granted special peddling privileges to
disabled veterans by allowing them to sell any goods without restriction in any area and regardless of
municipal rules. As a result of abuse of this law through "rent-a-vet" schemes, see Therese Fitzgerald,
Life on the Grand Boulevard, REAL EST. WKLY., June 19, 1991, at B2, the New York State Legislature
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others, unlicensed general vendors, the fourth group, present grave problems
of enforcement. The remainder of this Note will focus on these general
merchandise vendors.2
Although there are 853 licensed general merchandise vendors in the city, 21
only a few of those selling on the streets of New York City are licensed.22
Vendor licenses in New York are much sought after, as evidenced by the
waiting list of 1100 persons who have license applications pending with the
Department of Consumer Affairs.' The number of people who are granted
new licenses varies from year to year, depending upon how many vendors fail
to renew their licenses. 24 The wait for a new license can be as long as five
years.25
Because current enforcement operations have little "bite," incentives to
obtain a license and to function legally are few. 26 Even some licensed vendors
violate restrictions on the areas where they are permitted to operate. For
example, all vendors are prohibited from peddling anything but food and
printed materials in many of the streets in midtown and downtown Manhat-
21tan. Many vendors do not heed the restrictions, however, as these are the
areas with the highest volume of pedestrian traffic, making them very lucra-
tive. In order to draw vendors out of the most congested areas of the city,
amended the law in September 1991 to exempt New York City. Topics of the 7imes; Reclaiming Fifth
Avenue, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 1991, at D10. The original statute had applied to the entire state. Mixed
Reviews on 5th Ave. to Veterans' Peddling Curb, supra. In fact, only a short time before the state
legislature passed the amendment, the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court upheld the
statute in Kaswan v. Aponte, 553 N.Y.S.2d 407 (App. Div. 1990), reasoning that state law took precedence
over city regulations. Disabled veterans are now subject to the same regulations restricting the time and
place of vending activity as are other general vendors.
20. Perhaps surprisingly, the general merchandise vendor category includes vendors of religious items
and art vendors. Nonetheless, although vendors of religious items have no special protection under the laws
of New York, "it has been the policy [of the New York Police Department] to address religious peddler
conditions with warnings" as a result of "the volatile nature of enforcement." NEW YORK POLICE DEP'T,
PEDDLER HANDBOOK (n.d.) (on file with author). In contrast, art vendors are subject to the same level
of enforcement as other general merchandise vendors. Id.
21. Levine, supra note 18. This figure does not include disabled veterans, who are licensed under
a separate scheme. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
22. Interview with Tom Cusick, President, Fifth Avenue Association, in New York, N.Y. (Dec. 15,
1992).
23. Telephone Interview with Henry Valley, supra note 19. In September 1990, the Consumer Affairs
Department had a waiting list of 710 names that had been frozen since 1988. Levine, supra note 18. By
1991, the waiting list had grown to over 1000 names. TASK FORCE ON GEN. VENDORS, supra note 17,
at 10.
24. This number can vary from as few as 50 to as many as 200. Telephone Interview with Henry
Valley, supra note 19.
25. Int. No. 601, New York City Council § 1 (1992) (on file with author).
26. This situation is similar to that of taxicabs. A medallion is the taxi driver's equivalent of a
peddler's vending license. In order to retain a medallion, a medallion taxi driver must follow the rules.
An inevitable consequence of this regulated competition has been the appearance of unregulated gypsy cabs.
Licensed and unlicensed vendors may be analogous to licensed and unlicensed taxicabs in this respect-for
each there exists a limited number of licenses and a significant unregulated, competitive market.
27. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE tit. 20, ch. 2, subch. 27, Reg. 11 Relating to Streets Restricted
to General Vendors and Food Vendors.
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incentives and disincentives must trump the vendors' natural inclination to sell
in the locations frequented by the most people.
Anecdotal evidence indicates that over the past decade, the number of street
vendors throughout the city has increased dramatically. The precise number
of unlicensed general vendors is unknown, although most would agree that
unlicensed vendors greatly outnumber the 853 legal vendors in the city. Most
estimates of the number of illegal peddlers range from 10,000 to 16,500.2"
A conservative estimate is that fewer than forty percent of vendors are li-
censed. 29 The Peddler Task Force's Commanding Officer estimates that in
Manhattan there are three hundred illegal watch peddlers alone. 30 The recent
explosion in the number of illegal vendors has been attributed primarily to
economic forces and changes in the city's demographics. 3' High rents have
pushed some businesses out of stores and onto the sidewalks, and people are
eager to find bargains among the miles of curbside merchandise. Furthermore,
the constant influx of immigrants into New York City has been a continuing
source of new street vendors.32 While growth in other industries has declined,
street vending has flourished. In fact, "[p]eddling may be one of New York
City's few remaining growth industries.""
Though at first glance it may seem a petty offense, unlicensed vending is
highly visible and presents real problems to the residents and pedestrians of
a congested and fast-paced city. Tom Cusick, President of the Fifth Avenue
Association, has expressed serious concerns about the increase in the number
of street vendors: "These vendors clog our streets . . . misrepresent the quality
of their merchandise, operate in the underground economy, leave their trash
on the sidewalks, fail to pay many of their taxes and attract other undesirable
activities into our neighborhood.""4 Moreover, at times the vendors can be
confrontational, with "men get[ting] into fist fights over the best sidewalk
28. Louis Meixler, New York Cornering Peddlers, CHIC. TRI., May 16, 1993, at 8; Deborah Sontag,
Unlicensed Peddlers, Unfettered Dreams, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 1993, at A 1; interview with Tom Cusick,
supra note 22.
29. Interview with William H. Daly, supra note 18.
30. Interview with Lt. J.J. Johnson, supra note 18.
31. Levine, supra note 18.
32. Sontag, supra note 28. Many officials within the city's criminal justice system and other commen-
tators have observed that a significant number of the city's peddlers are Senegalese natives. See, e.g., James
Brooke, Senegal Hails Vendor Home From 5th Ave., N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 1987, at A3; Street Peddlers
From Senegal Flock to New York, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1985, at A51; Working the Street, ECONOMIST,
Oct. 27, 1984, at 73; interview with Lt. J.J. Johnson, supra note 18. The Senegalese began to appear in
significant numbers in 1983. Street Peddlers From Senegal Flock to New York, supra. Many of them do
not speak English. Interview with Nina Epstein, Attorney-in-Charge, The Legal Aid Society, in New York,
N.Y. (Dec. 14, 1992). And, unlike other vending groups, such as disabled veterans, the Senegalese do
not have strong political influence in the city. This has raised concerns that they have no one to protect
them from alleged instances of unfair targeting by the police. Id.
33. Levine, supra note 18.
34. TASK FORCE ON GEN. VENDORS, supra note 17, at 8 (quoting Tom Cusick, President of the Fifth
Avenue Association, who testified before a New York State Senate Committee chaired by Sen. Roy
Goodman (R-Manhattan) on Dec. 19, 1990).
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selling locations."35 Thus, when vendors become too numerous in one area,
they may pose safety problems and inconvenience passers-by.
Most of the wares sold by vendors are not stolen goods. In fact, only
between fifteen and twenty percent of the merchandise sold on the street is
"hot."36 Like other merchants, these sellers have wholesale suppliers.37 None-
theless, misrepresentations regarding the source or content of a product are
not uncommon. In 1988, the New York City Department of Consumer Affairs
purchased random samples of merchandise from vendors to assess their quality.
Examples of fraud included a five-dollar pair of hoop earrings labeled fourteen-
karat gold that contained no gold and a five-dollar scarf labeled cashmere that
was really polyester.38 Interestingly, consumers may not be disappointed by
the misrepresentations inherent in some counterfeit products. For example,
most consumers would not believe that a "real Gucci" bag can be bought for
fifteen dollars and therefore would not expect "Gucci" quality from such a
purchase. Nevertheless, this situation could be exceptional; consumers will not
always have sufficient knowledge regarding a product's authenticity to make
an informed decision as to whether to sacrifice quality for a lower price.
Vendors selling counterfeit goods present special problems to consumers.
Many counterfeit products sold by vendors do not meet safety standards. For
example, counterfeit dolls may contain hazardous substances, 9 unapproved
toys may have sharp edges, and counterfeit fragrances may include unsafe
chemical compositions.' In addition, many vendors sell products that are ap-
proved for sale in other countries and meet a lower standard of quality than
their counterparts approved for sale in the United States. Vendors obtain these
products on the "gray market" and are able to sell them at a lower price than
similar products in nearby stores." Moreover, because street vendors do not
generally cultivate regular customers, they may sell lower-quality products to
unknowing consumers.' Caveat emptor prevails, for unlicensed vendors often
change their location, and consumers of faulty products are usually without
35. Peter Knobler, Hell on Upper Broadway, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 1991, at A27.
36. Interview with Tom Cusick, supra note 22.
37. Working the Street, supra note 32.
38. James Barron, Street Vending Booths Open With the Leaves, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1990, at 44.
39. Joseph Berger, Fake Cabbage Patch Dolls are Seized, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1984, at 28. In one
Manhattan raid, Customs Service agents seized 20,000 counterfeit dolls that were believed to contain toxic
materials and reportedly were being sold by street peddlers. Id.; see also Sari Horwitz, CPSC, FBI Probing
Cabbage Patch Caper; Fake Dolls Eyed for Fire, Health Hazards, WASH. POST, Dec. 12, 1984, at DI1.
40. Interview with Lt. J.J. Johnson, supra note 18.
41. Products bought on the "gray market" generally have commonly known trademarks because the
producers often license, contract, or franchise foreign manufacturers to make the same products. These
goods enter the United States through unauthorized channels. They are intended only for foreign sale, yet
it is not illegal to sell them in the United States. Bob Weinstein, Street Vendors Lack the Right Stuff.
NEWSDAY, June 21, 1989, at 51. Products sold on the gray market include batteries, film, cameras,
cosmetics, clothing, and jewelry. Isadore Barmash, Retailers Say Ruling Will Tend to Stabilize Prices, N.Y.
TIMES, June 1, 1988, at D6.
42. Interview with Lt. J.J. Johnson, supra note 18.
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recourse. 43
Vendors are also of primary concern to the city's businesses. The vendors'
presence creates an economic battle for customers and for control of valuable
urban space. Unlicensed peddlers deprive city businesses of millions of dollars
in sales, avoid sales tax, and destroy the ambiance of posh areas such as Fifth
Avenue. The New York Department of Finance estimates the City's loss in
sales taxes to be $25 million annually." Unlicensed street vendors also share
in the advantages enjoyed by licensed vendors in that they pay no rent and
have no advertising or utility costs. Unlicensed street peddlers selling counter-
feit goods are considered the most troublesome by merchants and manufactur-
ers as well as by the police.45 They increase costs for name-brand companies
and the legitimate vendors and merchandisers who sell the authentic brand
products."
The area served by the Community Court is of particular importance to
the city due to the tourist revenue that it generates. In the first seven months
of 1991, arrests for unlicensed vending comprised nine percent of all non-
felony arrests in Midtown Precincts North and South, and the Tenth Pre-
cinct.47 Many city residents have cried out against the vendors, claiming that
"[t]heir appearance, the quality of their products, the litter, and the overcrowd-
ing of the sidewalks all contribute to a degrading" of the city's "visual im-
pact."41 Ultimately, confronting the problem of unlicensed vending necessari-
43. Weinstein, supra note 41.
44. Sontag, supra note 28. Estimates of unpaid sales taxes have ranged from $15 million, Working
the Street, supra note 32, to $300 million. Ronald Sullivan, Crackdown on Vendors in the Streets, N.Y.
TIMs, Apr. 13, 1993, at B1. The savings to individual peddlers may be quite significant. For example,
in October 1993, one street peddler was indicted for failing to report $180,000 in income that was earned
over three years from the sale of umbrellas, handbags, and gloves. Peddler Indicted for Tax Evasion, N.Y.
TIMEs, Oct. 28, 1983, at B4.
45. Sontag, supra note 28.
46. For example, legitimate merchandisers are hurt by the streetside sale of counterfeit umbrellas
labeled "Totes." Because authentic Totes-brand umbrellas are guaranteed for life, Totes Consumer Affairs,
Toll-Free Recorded Message (Feb. 22, 1994), some consumers go to stores selling genuine Totes umbrellas
for free replacements when their "Totes"-labeled umbrellas break. Unknowing employees may replace the
defective umbrellas.
47. Midtown Community Court Project, Annual Non-Felony Arrests in MTS, MTN, & the 10th
Precincts (compiling data produced by New York Police Department) (on file with author) [hereinafter
Annual Non-Felony Arrests]. These three precincts will comprise the jurisdictional "catchment area" of
the Community Court. Although the court has initially begun processing arraignments only for arrests made
in Midtown Precincts North and South, it is expected that the Tenth Precinct will later be added to its
jurisdiction.
48. Edward Munves, Jr., James Robinson Inc., Manhattan, Readers Join Brady Crusade to Take City
Sidewalks Back from Vendors, CRAIN'S N.Y. Bus., Sept. 22, 1986, at 10. The unwanted presence of street
vendors has been noted by residents across the city. One East Village resident lamented:
The hive of ragtag street peddlers infesting my neighborhood is more than a noisy and noisome
eyesore .... The police occasionally make half-hearted attempts to scatter the peddlers, but they
simply return once the officers have moved on. . . . The areas overrun by them are beginning
to resemble Calcutta, to the detriment of local retailers, restaurants and other businesses, not to
mention the residents who daily must wade through the blight.
George Zarycky, Without Food Vendors, Midtown Becomes Barren Moonscape; Astor Place Bazaar, N.Y.
TIMES, July 26, 1988 (letter to editor), at A20.
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ly involves a fragile balance of competing interests. Arguably, "[t]he most
contentious issue in New York City is probably not capital punishment or
abortion but street vendors. "49
Unlicensed vending is the only means of support for most street vendors.50
Because of the vendors' work ethic, some New Yorkers may be said to have
"an amused respect for pedlars [sic]. They see them as embodying the true
spirit of American capitalism." 5 "[I]f you disallow peddling," according to
one New Yorker, "then you disallow the American Way."52 Vendors may
even be "doing something constructive" in "functioning as a bazaar" and
providing consumers with lower prices, convenience, and greater diversity of
products. 3 This activity is not traditionally considered to be malum in se,54
and many people believe that unlicensed vendors are somehow different from
garden-variety criminals because vendors perform a community service of
sorts.
Although many New Yorkers remain ambivalent toward vendors, neighbor-
hoods throughout the city have tried various methods to clear their streets of
the threatening, unsafe conditions created by peddlers. One neighborhood
group on the Upper West Side planned a demonstration in order to inform
other neighborhood residents of their plan to "literally clean up [their] own
neighborhood" with the support of representatives of the Police and Sanitation
Departments."5 However, during the early morning hours of the day of the
planned demonstration, "four men went on their own cleanup campaign" and
destroyed the peddlers' boxes, tables, chairs, and "scavenged refuse that was
being sold each day."56 According to one resident's account of the incident,
the broken remains were picked up later that morning by the Sanitation Depart-
ment, and the street remained clear both for the demonstration later that
afternoon and for the next few weeks. This resident expressed a frustration and
desperation common to many neighborhoods: "Is this what it takes to clean
up our neighborhoods? Has New York turned into such a war zone that each
block needs a militia to maintain social order?"57 As exemplified by this
neighborhood's experience, some residents have become so frustrated by the
vendors that they have resorted to violence. Despite other, more civilized
attempts by neighborhood residents, police, and city officials to limit street
vending, the problem continues.
49. Vendors: Good, Bad and Good-Bad, supra note 17.
50. Interview with Judge Robert G.M. Keating, supra note 5.
51. Working the Street, supra note 32.
52. Interview with Jeanelle Farris, Times Square Business Improvement District, in New York, N.Y.
(Dec. 15, 1992).
53. Barron, supra note 38.
54. Interview with Judge Robert G.M. Keating, supra note 5.
55. Knobler, supra note 35.
56. Id.
57. Id.
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II. STEP-BY-STEP PROCESSING OF UNLICENSED VENDING MISDEMEANANTS
A. Applicable Law and its Enforcement
General merchandise vending is regulated by the New York City Adminis-
trative Code and, more recently, by the New York Penal Law Code.58 The
Administrative Code contains numerous restraints on vendors' manner of sale,
including: restrictions on the placement of vending carts; prohibitions against
vending in certain areas; and guidelines limiting the height, width, and length
of vending tables.59 The Department of Consumer Affairs has the authority
under the Administrative Code to hold public hearings considering petitions
to restrict general vendors from selling on designated streets.60 The commis-
sioner must determine whether the presence of vendors constitutes "a serious
and immediate threat to the health, safety and well-being of the public"
because the street has become too congested by pedestrian or vehicular traffic
to permit such vending.6' The resultant list of street, day, and hour restric-
tions throughout the city comprises over twenty pages. Licensed vendors who
sell on restricted streets are given a notice of violation and a summons to
appear before the Environmental Control Board (ECB).62
The Code provides that any vendor operating without a license "shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not . ..more than one
thousand dollars, or by imprisonment for not more than three months or by
both such fine and imprisonment."63 The Code also allows a police officer
to seize a vendor's vehicle and goods if the vendor cannot produce evidence
of a license or is peddling on a restricted street; these items may be subject
to forfeiture upon notice and judicial determination." The Department of
Consumer Affairs and the Police Department share jurisdiction over enforce-
ment.65 The Department of Consumer Affairs has an independent inspection
unit that assists the Police Department in making arrests.66
58. Although the penal law does not address street peddlers specifically, it prohibits the manufacture,
distribution, and sale of counterfeit goods. The selling of counterfeit goods valued over $1000 is a felony.
N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 165.72-.73, 70.00 (1994). Thus, in contrast to the noncriminal, unclassified
misdemeanor status of violations of the New York City Administrative Code, the penal law imposes a
relatively high penalty on the peddling of counterfeit goods.
59. NEw YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 20-465 (1985 & Supp. 1993). For example, it is illegal to
vend without a table, with a table over five feet high, or fewer than 20 feet from an entranceway to any
building. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. § 20-465(l)(1).
62. Interview with William H. Daly, supra note 18.
63. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 20-472(a) (1985 & Supp. 1993).
64. Id. §§ 20-468, -469.





Also on the enforcement side, the Peddler Task Force is the city's most
concentrated effort to reduce the number of unlicensed vendors. Task Force
officers are assigned to police precincts67 and provide them with expertise
specific to the peddler problem. In 1990, the Task Force was comprised of
twenty-five police officers and five supervisors, and covered Manhattan from
Battery Park to 59th Street.6" By 1991, the unit had grown to sixty officers.
Illegal vendors generally come to the attention of the police in one of two
ways: Either officers notice them while they are on patrol, or community
residents and merchants complain to the police.69 The police pay extra atten-
tion to more congested areas of the city,7" and they often recognize violators
because most unlicensed vendors are repeat offenders.7" Although recent
statistics are not available, during the first nine months of the fiscal year
ending June 30, 1983, summonses were issued to 25,728 general vendors,
19,513 of whom were unlicensed.7 2 General vendors' default rates in paying
fines were startling. Only seven percent of these vendors actually paid.73
As a response to the perception that many vendors view monetary fines as
merely a "cost of doing business," the Peddler Task Force has periodically
intensified its efforts to make arrests and confiscate vendors' goods. In 1989,
the Task Force made 3411 arrests and 5174 confiscations.74 Notwithstanding
these efforts, this type of aggressive and increased enforcement is ineffective
as a large-scale, long-term solution. Although such an approach may deter
some peddlers, it also drains the system's resources. Arrests require many
hours of police officers' time, and the procedure by which confiscated goods
are marked and stored has been characterized as unnecessarily wasteful.75
Another major player in the enforcement of criminal penalties against
unlicensed vendors is the Fifth Avenue Association. Founded in 1907, the Fifth
Avenue Association is the "ears and voice" of businesspeople and merchants
on and around Fifth Avenue.76 The Association addresses a wide variety of
problems, but only in the last two years has illegal vending become a major
issue for this group of merchants.' Because street vending is more concen-
67. The vendor units in Midtown Precincts North and South each have approximately six officers
assigned to them. Interview with Adam D'Amico, supra note 17.
68. Levine, supra note 18.
69. id.
70. The Empire State Building region, 34th Street, and 57th Street are some of these areas. Interview
with Lt. J.J. Johnson, supra note 18.
71. Id.
72. William G. Blair, Sidewalk Goods of Discounters Seized in Raids, N.Y. TIMES, April 14, 1983,
at BI.
73. Id.
74. Levine, supra note 18.
75. See Sontag, supra note 28.
76. Fitzgerald, supra note 19.
77. Interview with Tom Cusick, supra note 22.
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trated in the Times Square Area than in any other,78 the Association has
lobbied for much of the law dealing with unlicensed vending.79 Not only has
the Association participated in precedent-setting litigation,"0 but it has also
been a significant force in the formulation of legislation dealing with unlicensed
vendors. The Fifth Avenue Association has been, and likely will continue to
be, closely involved in efforts to rid the city of unlicensed vendors.
B. New York's Criminal Justice System
Unlicensed vending cases and other misdemeanors are processed at the
New York City Criminal Court. The Criminal Court in Manhattan, located
at 100 Centre Street, disposes of cases very rapidly. In terms of the number
of cases handled, at least one judge regards the Criminal Court as "better than
any other urban court."'" Given the startling volume of cases that the court
must process every year, it must move cases quickly to keep the system
operational. The Criminal Court sees between 250,000 and 300,000 cases per
year, including both summonses and arrests. Of these, approximately 55,000
of the more serious cases are diverted to the New York Supreme Court. 12 On
average, then, each of the approximately eighty-five Criminal Court judges83
must deal with 3500 cases per year." In 1990, the Criminal Court disposed
of approximately 213,000 cases.85 Among these were 65,000 of the 114,000
cases that began as felony arrests, 142,000 misdemeanor arrests, and 7000
violations.*6 In the words of Judge Robert Keating, however, the inevitable
consequence is that "we don't do much with the cases we dispose of. "87
Hence, given the cost of operating the Criminal Court, this is a very expensive
system for simply dismissing cases.88 One critic noted, "so long as we contin-
ue to make the Court responsible for dealing with all of the conduct which
society has declared to be offensive .... [A]II that can be hoped for is a better
78. Interview with Hamilton Robinson, Chief of Security, Times Square Business Improvement
District, in New York, N.Y. (Dec. 15, 1992).
79. The Fifth Avenue Association represents merchants in the area of Fifth Avenue from Washington
Square Park to 96th Street, east of Sixth Avenue and west of Lexington Avenue. Fitzgerald, supra note
19. Its interest in the development of the Midtown Community Court is explained by the Association's
geographical overlap with the court's jurisdictional "catchment area." See supra note 1I and accompanying
text; infra note 177 and accompanying text.
80. See, e.g., supra note 19.
81. Interview with Judge Robert G.M. Keating, supra note 5.
82. Id. An alternative to arrest, a summons is a written order notifying an individual that he has been
charged with an offense. The summons directs the person to appear in court at a later date to answer the
charge.
83. Subin, supra note 2, at 1.
84. Interview with Judge Robert G.M. Keating, supra note 5.
85. Subin, supra note 2, at 1.
86. Id.




working dispositional machine."8 9 Nevertheless, to some officials within the
system, rapid disposition, even absent a significant substantive penalty, is a
measure of success in itself.
The enormity of the New York City criminal justice operation and the
magnitude of its task are best understood in terms of the resources allocated
to the entities involved. The budgets of the primary offices are approximately
$65 million, $500 million, and $1.6 billion for the Criminal Court, the District
Attorney's Office, and the New York Police Department, respectively.9" Due
to the sheer number of cases, however, judges, prosecutors, and defense
attorneys often limit themselves to "a largely clerical role."9" Of the 213,000
cases disposed of by the Criminal Court in 1990, only 0.4% went to trial. All
other cases entering the Criminal Court were dismissed or disposed of through
plea bargains.92
C. Processing of the Offender
The arrest-to-arraignment process used in New York City is more compli-
cated than that in most cities. 93 Upon observing a street vendor selling goods,
a police officer asks to see the vendor's license. If the vendor is unlicensed,
the officer may then arrest him. 94 However, given the low visibility and low
priority of this crime, police discretion often determines whether a particular
unlicensed vending case will enter the criminal justice system at all. If the
officer proceeds with an arrest, the vendor is brought to the station house of
the local precinct where he is checked for identification. 9' At the precinct,
a Desk Appearance Ticket (DAT) determination is made, usually within three
89. Subin, supra note 2, at 12. Many commentators are critical of the New York City criminal justice
system. Aric Press has noted that "criminal justice in New York is a system in name only." Aric Press,
Piecing Together New York's Criminal Justice System: The Response to Crack, 43 REc. ASs'N BAR CITY
N.Y. 541, 542 (1988). Press further explained: "The picture ... that emerges from an examination of
the city system under stress is that it's a bit like Samuel Johnson's dog: the wonder is that it walks at all."
Id. at 543-44.
90. Interview with Judge Robert G.M. Keating, supra note 5. The cost of operating the criminal justice
system is difficult to measure. In one study based on 1977 figures, the cost of the Criminal Court's
operations was over $150 million. Subin, supra note 2, at 1. The cost of the Criminal Court judiciary is
$60,000, and the cost of prosecutors and defense attorneys operating in the court is approximately $50
million. Id. In 1987, the budget of the New York Police Department was $1.326 billion. Raymond D.
Horton, How Best to Use 5,000 More Police; the Finest Can Be Even Finer, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 22, 1990,
at 23. The overall budget for the criminal defense operations of the Legal Aid Society is $60 million. Daniel
Wise, City Seeks $4.8 Million Cut from LegalAid's Budget, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 10, 1991, at 1. The budget
of the Manhattan District Attorney's Office alone is $54 million. Id.
91. Subin, supra note 2, at 4.
92. Id.
93. POLICING NEW YORK CITY, supra note 6, at 54.
94. Because the majority of street vendors are men, the masculine pronoun is used to refer to them
throughout this Note.
95. In addition, the police may seize a vendor's pushcart, stand, or goods, pursuant to NEW YORK,
N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 20-468(e) (1985 & Supp. 1993).
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hours. 96 An offender is given a DAT only if three conditions exist: He has
verifiable identification, he is not charged with a felony, and he has no out-
standing warrants. The issuance of a DAT is essentially station-house release
(i.e. a summons issued by the desk officer), and the offender is expected to
return to court of his own volition on the date provided for arraignment.97
The court date is generally three weeks from the day of arrest.98
Unlicensed vending offenders are issued DATs more often than any other
non-felony offenders. In a recent period, eighty-one percent of unlicensed
vending arrestees in Midtown Precincts North and South and the Tenth Pre-
cinct were issued DATs.99 The remainder either had no verifiable identifica-
tion or had outstanding warrants. An average of only fifty-one percent of all
misdemeanor arrestees-those arrested for unlicensed vending, fare-beating,
petit larceny, drugs, prostitution, and assault-were issued DATs during this
period. "o
If the arrested individual does not have identification, or if there is an
outstanding warrant for his arrest, he is transferred to central booking. 101 At
central booking, a staff member of the Criminal Justice Agency interviews
each defendant to complete an "interview report" for use in determining bail
or release conditions at arraignment. At present, this form is one page long
and requires information with respect to the offender's family, residence,
96. Interview with John Williams, Operations Coordinator, Midtown Community Court, in New York,
N.Y. (Feb. 1, 1993).
97. Interview with Deirdre Newton, Assistant District Attorney, in New York, N.Y. (Dec. 14, 1992).
Although DATs are routinely given out, the street name for these tickets-"disappearance tickets"-is
a more accurate description. In fact, an average of 45% of those served with DATs do not appear on their
assigned court date. Jan Hoffman, A User-Friendly Experiment in Justice, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 1, 1993, at
B 1. The number of arrestees who do not show up for arraignment is astounding-of the 64,153 DATs New
York issued last year, 29,510 individuals did not appear. Ron Scherer, New York Gives Criminals
'Disappearance Tickets,' CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 15, 1993, at 1. When an individual does not
appear, a bench warrant is issued for the person's arrest. However, in most cases the City does not actively
seek to enforce the warrant and instead waits for the person to be arrested again. In addition, many
individuals have more than one DAT. Id.
DATs recently have come under fire from Paul Shechtman, former Counsel to the Manhattan District
Attorney. Id. DATs were originally conceived to relieve the heavy burden on the courts given the large
number of misdemeanor arrests in the city. Rather than the usual two nights' detention prior to arraignment,
release pending a future court date is issued. Unfortunately, DATs are "widely ignored" by arrestees, and
the problem has grown to the point that the District Attorney's Office has compiled a list of 3000 recidi-
vists. Id. These repeat offenders, known as "'the stealth bombers of the criminal justice system since they
fly below the scope of the felony court,'" are no longer eligible to receive DATs. Instead, they are held
until arraignment. Id. (quoting Jeremy Travis, Deputy Commissioner for Legal Matters, New York Police
Dep't).
98. Interview with Officer Adam D'Amico, supra note 17.
99. Annual Non-Felony Arrests, supra note 47.
100. Id.
101. Id. Only men are taken to central booking; women go directly to court. Interview with John
Williams, supra note 96.
Approximately 300 people await arraignment daily in Manhattan, yet the holding cells at 100 Centre
Street can hold only 180 detainees. Therefore, when the 100 Centre Street cells are full, the overflow
detainees are held in police precinct lockups. Elliott Pinsley & Sam Adler, More Holding Pens Sought for
100 Centre Basement, MANHATTAN LAW., May 1990, at 6.
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employment, and criminal record. The court uses the information gathered
during this interview at arraignment to determine whether the offender has
sufficient ties to the community to be released on his own recognizance. If he
cannot, the court sets the amount of bail. °2 After the paperwork has been
completed at central booking, the vendor is held until arraignment. This arrest-
to-arraignment period cannot normally exceed twenty-four hours.1 3 The
average period is between twelve and twenty-four hours."° For vendors the
time from arrest to arraignment is usually relatively short because there is no
"rap sheet" that must be reviewed.
D. Processing of Attendant Paperwork
The movement of an offender's attendant paperwork is separate from the
movement of the offender himself, and the processing of paperwork can be
a significant burden on the arresting officer. In general, after arrest the officer
meets with an assistant district attorney (ADA) at the District Attorney's Office
to review the case and waits while the ADA writes the complaint. 10 5 The
police officer must then approve and sign the complaint."° A common
complaint among officers is that they spend too much time waiting at the
District Attorney's Office after an arrest. One officer remarked that "peddlers
are beating me out of court-I'm still doing paperwork. "'07 A police officer's
responsibilities following arrest may consume hours of regular time and
overtime.
The expedited affidavit process (EAP), designed specifically for unlicensed
vending cases, helps to alleviate some of the burden on arresting officers by
reducing the amount of time between arrest and arraignment. In order to take
advantage of this program, the officer must have observed the following
activity prior to arrest: (1) suspect offering merchandise for sale, and/or (2)
suspect making verbal statements advertising merchandise for sale, and/or (3)
suspect making a sale.'0 8 The program permits the arresting officer to sign
a written affidavit that is transmitted to the District Attorney's Office, thus
allowing the ADA to draft complaints without requiring the arresting officer's
102. Id.
103. People ex rel. Maxian er rel. Roundtree v. Brown, 570 N.E.2d 223, 225 (1991) (noting,
however, that presumption against prearraignment detention exceeding 24 hours can be rebutted by an
acceptable explanation). The 24-hour rule is based on N.Y. CRlM. PROC. LAW § 140.20(1) (McKinney
1992).
104. lnterviewwithPeterKougasian, AssistantDistrictAttorney, in New York, N.Y. (Nov. 17, 1992).
105. POLICING NEW YORK CITY, supra note 6, at 54.
106. Interview with Maxwell Wiley, Assistant District Attorney, in New York, N.Y. (Dec. 14, 1992).
107. Interview with Officer Kevin Bums, Community Affairs, New York Police Department, in New
York, N.Y. (Nov. 17, 1992).
108. New York Police Dep't, Operations Order: Program to Effectively Expedite ECAB Cases of
Unlicensed General Vending in Patrol Precincts Within the Patrol Boroughs Manhattan South and Manhattan
North (No. 80) 1 (June 15, 1992) (on file with author).
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physical presence." ° If the case qualifies for EAP treatment and the officer
chooses to use the standardized form affidavit, the information is sent by
facsimile to the District Attorney's Office. The necessary information is then
sent to data processing so that the actual complaint can be drafted.
More recently, some precincts have instituted the DAT Express program,
an offshoot of the EAP, as another time-saving device.l"0 For certain catego-
ries of misdemeanors, the program obviates the need for police officers to go
to the District Attorney's Office for the complaint to be drawn; rather, the
arresting police officer uses a computerized form to transmit the relevant
information."' This reduces the number of hours required to process the
case, because the officers do not have to spend time waiting for ADAs. Where
the program is being used, the offender is taken directly to the precinct after
arrest and a determination is made as to his release.1 2
E. Arraignment and Disposition
Legal Aid Society attorneys frequently represent unlicensed vendors at
arraignment." 3 In addition, many vendors belong to informal associations
that pool their money to provide their own representation. 14 At arraignment,
the District Attorney's Office nearly always offers unlicensed vending arrestees
a violation and either a fine or community service in exchange for a guilty
plea." 5 Under the New York Penal Code, this violation is disorderly con-
duct, the lowest possible charge. Although disorderly conduct technically is
not a crime, it will become part of the individual's rap sheet. In addition, the
ADA will generally ask for a delay of one year in sealing the record." 6
ADAs have the authority to accept a plea to less than the record charge, and
they have the discretion to condition the acceptance on a specific sentence." 7
ADAs have legal control over the charge only; the judge has legal control
over sentencing. Nonetheless, the ability of the District Attorney's Office to
make offers of disorderly conduct has given it much more control over its
caseload."' Because unlicensed vending is on the low end of the "sliding
scale of crime," the District Attorney's Office cannot afford to prosecute all
of these cases if the defendant does not accept a plea bargain."' If an offer
109. Id.
110. Interview with Officer Adam D'Amico, supra note 17.
111. Interview with Deirdre Newton, supra note 97.
112. Id.
113. Interview with Nina Epstein, supra note 32.
114. Interview with Deirdre Newton, supra note 97.
115. Interview with Maxwell Wiley, supra note 106.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Interview with Deirdre Newton, supra note 97.
119. Interview with Peter Kougasian, supra note 104.
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is too harsh, a defendant will plead not guilty. By pleading not guilty, unli-
censed vendors have the potential to wreak havoc on the system by going to
trial. Thus, if a vending offender pleads not guilty, two dispositions are most
likely: Either the case is dismissed for lack of prosecution or the defendant
"warrants out"-he does not show up for his next court date and a bench
warrant is issued for his arrest. 20
Not surprisingly, the great majority of unlicensed vending cases are
disposed of by plea at arraignment in the Criminal Court. 2 ' In fact, during
the period between January and June of 1991, eighty-six percent of all unli-
censed vending cases in Manhattan were disposed of at arraignment; an
average of sixty-one percent of all misdemeanors were disposed of at arraign-
ment during that time period. 22 The disposition of unlicensed vending cases
is not unlike other dispositions generally in the Criminal Court. This is a
system in which 43% of the cases in the Criminal Court are ultimately dis-
missed, 30% of convicted defendants receive no time in jail, and 17% of those
convicted serve fewer than twenty days in jail."'a
The sanctioning of unlicensed vending cases is quite routine, for judges
have little room at the margins to be either more stern or more creative. The
Manhattan District Attorney's Office recorded the following outcomes of
disposed unlicensed vending cases during the first four months of 1991:124
3 % of those arrested were sentenced to jail time, 34 % were fined, 13 % were
sentenced to time served, 41 % were given a conditional discharge, 6% were
given an adjournment and contemplation of dismissal (ACD), and 3 % had their
cases dismissed outright."2 Relatively few vending offenders are given time
served because most receive DATs which do not entail time served at all.
Furthermore, until recently, community service was not available as an option
for judges in sentencing offenders at the Criminal Court. However, since the
institution of the Community Services Office in Criminal Court, ADAs nearly
always offer vendors a violation plus either a fine or community service.
126
The community service programs presently offered at the Criminal Court
include work with the Parks Department, the Transit Authority, the Depart-
120. Id.
121. Letter from Michael I. Magnani, Law Clerk to Administrative Judge, New York City Criminal
Court, to Linda M. Ricci (Feb. 24, 1993) (on file with author).
122. Midtown Community Court Project, Dispositions: All of Manhattan (1991) (compiling data
produced by Office of Court Administration) (on file with author).
123. Subin, supra note 2, at 18.
124. This time period was before the institution of community service sanctions at the Criminal Court.
125. Midtown Community Court Project, Manhattan District Attorney Outcomes of Disposed Cases
(1991) (compiling data produced by the District Attorney's Office) (based on figures from MTS, MTN,
10th, and 17th precincts) (on file with author). The fines issued to offenders may be only $50, an amount
the vendors likely consider a mere cost of doing business. Interview with Lt. J.J. Johnson, supra note 18.
A defendant sentenced to "time served" receives credit for the time he has served in custody in jail
between his arrest and the imposition of sentence, and he is not given any additional custodial sentence.
126. Interview with Maxwell Wiley, supra note 106.
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ment of Human Resources, the Mayor's Office, and the Department of Correc-
tions.17 Last year 9000 people participated in the community service pro-
grams mandated by the Criminal Court.128 When the establishment of the
Community Court was initially contemplated, the Criminal Court system
offered few sentencing alternatives: Until four years ago, the Criminal Court
had no community service or drug treatment programs; until three years ago,
it had no AIDS education.129 The Community Court's appeal lay in its prom-
ise for unique sanctioning alternatives. During the period of the Community
Court's development, however, many of these alternatives have become a
regular part of the Criminal Court system, making the Community Court's
offerings appear less and less novel.130
Unlicensed vending is an unclassified misdemeanor and consequently no
fingerprints are taken for record purposes.' As a result, from the court's
perspective, every arrest is "the first" arrest for this group of offenders.' 32
Thus, although the recidivism rate for this category of offenders is very high,
prior arrests for unlicensed vending have virtually no consequence in the
sentencing of a repeat offender.
In the final analysis, unlicensed vending often is treated as no more than
a nuisance by the courts. In fact, the procedures for dealing with peddling
crimes have been streamlined to such an extent that they are often not prose-
cuted at all.' The following story is indicative of the gravity, or lack there-
of, with which many judges treat unlicensed vending arrests. In December
1989, street vendor William Thigpen was arrested twice in the same week for
peddling lighted yo-yos without a permit. The first time, Criminal Court Judge
John Stackhouse dismissed the charge. The second time, the Judge dismissed
the case after having the following conversation with the arrestee [partial
transcript]:
ADA: Your Honor, you might remember you dismissed Mr.
Thigpen on Monday or Tuesday.
Court: It is true.
Defendant: I had a few left.
Court: Any with lights on them?
Defendant: Yes.
Court: What did you sell those for?
127. Interview with Judge Charles Solomon, Supervising Judge of the New York County Criminal
Court, in New York, N.Y. (Feb. 1, 1993).
128. Interview with Paul Shechtman, former Counsel to the Manhattan District Attorney, District
Attorney's Office, in New York, N.Y. (Feb. 8, 1993).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. This means that those arrested are not given a New York State Identification (NYSID) number.
132. Interview with Officer Adam D'Amico, supra note 17.




Court: That's a reasonable price.
Defense Counsel: You need for your children?
Court: I do. I don't think it is appropriate for me to buy them. In the
spirit of the holiday, I am dismissing it.
ADA: Your Honor, People vigorously take exception. 34
According to ADA Peter Kougasian, during this second arraignment, the
ADAs questioned the judge: "Didn't he promise not to do it again? Didn't you
promise?"' During his first arraignment, William Thigpen had promised
to stop selling. " [In an object lesson intended more for the judge than for the
defendant," then-ADA Paul Shechtman appealed the case for the Manhattan
District Attorney's Office.' 36 One inevitably must ask why this seemingly
trivial case was even brought. Kougasian explains that "police get huge
amounts of overtime for silly arrests."137
On May 31, 1990, a three-judge panel of the Appellate Term, First Depart-
ment, handed down a decision that agreed with Shechtman. The judges stated
that Judge Stackhouse's ground for dismissal, "the spirit of the holiday," was
inappropriate. 38 Thigpen's lawyer commented: "We're talking about selling
yo-yos on the street. This is just plain silly." 39 And so the story ended, but
the legacy of street vendor William Thigpen has remained as "a symbol of
urban lawlessness for selling yo-yos without a license at Christmastime. " "
Although William Thigpen's peddling charges were twice dismissed, he
in fact "did time" solely as a result of his arrests.' Thigpen spent two days
in a police precinct lockup while awaiting arraignment, for there was not
enough holding space at 100 Centre Street. 42 Although the amount of time
between a suspect's arrest and arraignment has been reduced during the last
few years, this was a significant problem until recently. 13
The relatively short and insignificant career of William Thigpen teaches
many important lessons about the criminal justice system in New York City.
134. Elliott Pinsley, D.A. Raps Judge for Springing Yo-Yo Vendor. MANHATTAN LAW., Apr. 1990
(Partial Transcript), at 5.
135. Interview with Peter Kougasian, supra note 104.
136. Pinsley, supra note 134.
137. Interview with Peter Kougasian, supra note 104.
138. Elliott Pinsley, Yo-Yo- Man 11: Back to You, Judge, MANHATTAN LAW., July-Aug. 1990, at 9.
139. Id.
140. Pinsley, supra note 134.
141. Pinsley & Adler, supra note 101.
142. Id.
143. In May 1990, the average wait between arrest and arraignment was between 35 and 50 hours.
Id. One-third to one-half of this waiting period was due to the difficulties in locating a suspect and bringing
him to court from the police lockup. Id. Since the decision by the New York Court of Appeals in
Roundiree, a detainment of more than 24 hours may be challenged by the arrestee. People ex rel. Maxian
ex rel. Roundtree v. Brown, 570 N.E.2d 223, 225 (1991). Further detention must be supported by a
satisfactory explanation of the delay. See supra note 103.
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First, it underscores the relative lack of seriousness with which some system
participants view unlicensed vending. Second, it demonstrates that even if on
principle such a vendor should be prosecuted and sentenced, the lack of
adequate resources precludes a judge from imposing any real sanction. Third,
the lack of space for the defendant in the 100 Centre Street holding cells
speaks to the inadequacy of a system that was designed to accommodate many
fewer crimes and criminals. And finally, the fact that William Thigpen spent
two days in a police precinct lock-up reinforces the notion that the process is
the punishment for this type of case.
In fact, the pretrial process itself is often the only punishment.'" The
notion that "the process is the punishment" is contrary to the belief that
defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty. The procedural punish-
ment for unlicensed vending in New York City includes detention until disposi-
tion as well as forfeiture of one's goods. The police have a great deal of
discretion in making arrests, and their decisions significantly affect the charges
brought and the potential for eventual release of the suspect. Pretrial costs in
the Criminal Court appear high relative to the actual penalties meted out. Yet,
despite the shortcomings of the pretrial criminal system, the need for recog-
nized formalities persists. Even the most remote possibility of incarceration
for defendants appearing in court argues for a formal, adversarial process. 4 '
III. DESIGN FOR CHANGE: THE MIDTOWN COMMUNITY COURT
A. Community Policing
The development of the Community Court is a natural extension of the
community policing efforts commenced in early 1991. The driving force
behind this "radical" change in direction'" is the desire to transform the
New York City Police Department into a neighborhood-based organization
such that "every neighborhood will have one or more police officers assigned
to it and responsible for helping the residents of the community prevent crime,
develop a capability for order maintenance and improve the quality of
life."' The philosophy of the reform is based upon the notion that the
relationship between the community and the police must be a partnership.'48
144. See MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT 201 (1992).
145. Id. at 242.
146. Interview with Jeremy Travis, Deputy Commissioner for Legal Matters, New York Police
Department, in New York, N.Y. (Nov. 17, 1992). For a discussion of the community policing philosophy
and its application in solving the problems of particular precincts, see NEW YORK POLICE DEP'T, CIVIL
ENFORCEMENT INITIATIVE (1992).
147. POLICING NEW YORK CITY, supra note 6, at i.
148. Interview with Jeremy Travis, supra note 146.
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This partnership has three objectives: (1) identification and definition of
problems, (2) creation of strategies to overcome the problems, and (3) evalua-
tion of their success.'4 9 Without input from the community, the police tend
to wait for something serious to happen;' 150 consequently, most resources are
allocated to the most serious and violent crimes. But many communities care
about low-level crimes, and the definition of these problems can be instrumen-
tal to a satisfactory policing system.
Decentralization is a primary goal of community policing.' The Police
Department has stated that for the community policing program to be success-
ful, it must shift its focus to the neighborhood. 152 The Police Department is
organized around seventy-five precincts, which are loosely correlated around
the city's ethnic neighborhoods. 53 Under the community policing initiative,
the police officer communicates directly with the city's residents in order to
identify the major problems of individual neighborhoods. Thus, a seemingly
minor problem, such as the presence of street vendors, will be addressed if
it is identified by community residents. Before the formal introduction of
community participation in this process, the police tended to devote more time
and resources to major crimes, without realizing that other significant commu-
nity problems were being virtually ignored.' 54 The Community Court seeks
flexibility and innovation consistent with the notion of community policing.
In general, the police are received positively by the community. Communi-
ty policing is designed to capitalize on that fact. In contrast, the courts are
generally viewed in a negative light. The Criminal Court is inaccessible to the
community, and, as a result, the court's connection with the community is
attenuated at best. Because offenders currently are processed downtown at 100
Centre Street, they are usually physically located some distance away from the
neighborhood where they were arrested. As a result, rarely is someone from
the defendant's community or family present when the offender is being
arraigned. The development of the Community Court is an attempt to remedy
this feeling of isolation and distance between the system of justice and the
community in order to increase the community's involvement in what is being
done and how it is being accomplished. 55 In this way, the Community Court
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. POLICING NEW YORK CITY, supra note 6, at 12.
152. Id. at 34.
153. Id. at 11.
154. Interview with Jeremy Travis, supra note 146.
155. The "downtown" Criminal Court and Rikers Island jail perpetuate the feeling of isolation by
removing the processing of these crimes from the city's communities, for "[tihe very functioning of a
system is inhibited by its physical isolation." Richard Danzig, Towards the Creation of a Complementary,
Decentralized System of Criminal Justice, in NEIGHBORHOOD JUSTICE: ASSESSMENT OF AN EMERGING IDEA
4 (Roman Tomasic & Malcolm M. Feeley eds., 1982). Overcoming the "'out of sight, out of mind'
syndrome" would be a significant first step, because "[elven if no benefits were realized from having the
criminal justice system under community control, putting parts of that system in communities would have
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is a natural adjunct to community policing.
B. History, Structure, and Design of the Community Court
The Community Court is an attempt to move the lower court closer to a
crime-ridden neighborhood so that it might be in a position to give lesser
crimes more attention."5 6 The project has thrived on notions of risk, change,
and innovation. The developers of the Community Court have sought to meet
the challenge of one critic of the present system "to think radically enough
about solutions to the [Criminal] Court's problems."157 Although the Com-
munity Court has developed in a direction probably not envisioned by this
critic, its developers appear to have internalized his mantra of radical change.
As the result of a private/public partnership, the Community Court has a
unique slate of supporters and critics and an interesting history. The court was
conceived by Gerald Shoenfeld, Chairman of the Shubert Organization, the
world's largest theater organization. Shoenfeld's interest in a community court
might, at first glance, seem odd, but his interest is quickly explained by his
desire for "the reclamation of Times Square. " "' Shoenfeld's organization
had witnessed Times Square's decline into a haven for concentrated porno-
graphy that increasingly threatened the theater as an institution and this part
of New York City in general. Forty-second Street was taking on a "wasteland
quality." As he observed, "bad uses attract bad uses and good uses attract
good uses."' 59 The image of the city and of the "Crossroads of the World"
was being tarnished by the undesirable behavior that overwhelmed the area.
Many activities in the area, including unlicensed vending, were incompatible
with the reclamation of Times Square. In fact, in Shoenfeld's words, "vending
became condoned by Mayor Koch who called it 'the American way.'"16 The
Shubert Organization's goal was to create a climate conducive to the redevelop-
ment of Times Square. Thus explained, Shoenfeld's interest in the development
of a community court is clear: As an institution, the theater makes an impor-
tant economic contribution to the city, and the existence of the theater was
threatened by the quality-of-life crimes in the Times Square area. The idea for
a community court was part of a larger effort by the Shubert Organization;16'
ultimately, the Mayor's Midtown Citizens' Committee met with twenty-seven
significant advantages." Id.
156. Spotlight on Justice in imes Square, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 17, 1991, § 4, at 16. For readings on
the neighborhood justice movement, decentralization, the role of the community, and alternatives to courts,
see generally NEIGHBORHOOD JUSTICE, supra note 155.
157. Subin, supra 2, at 18.
158. Interview with Gerald Shoenfeld and Herb Sturz, supra note 12.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Among other efforts to reclaim the Times Square Area, the Shubert Organization sponsored the
locating of the convention center and the Marriott Hotel in the Times Square vicinity. Id.
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judges of the Criminal Court to consider the idea.162
The Community Court is a three-year experiment and sits at 314 West 54th
Street. The refurbishment of the building in preparation for the court cost the
city approximately $500,000;163 the City will pay $1.6 million for the pro-
ject. " The majority of the court's remaining costs are funded by private
initiative. Shoenfeld has raised $2.2 million over three years to fund the
court. 165 In addition, he received $110,000 up front to fund the project until
it was approved by the Mayor's Office.'" Some of the largest donations to
the project are in-kind; many groups are donating staff to assist in the Commu-
nity Court. 67
As one approaches 314 West 54th Street, a white and green striped flag
boldly announces the existence of the Community Court. In contrast to the
heavy gray decor of the Criminal Court downtown, this court sports a white,
clean newness. 161 Just inside the front door, a television screen displays the
docket for the day, including each defendant's name, the most serious charge,
the defendant's attorney, and the status of the case. Similar screens are found
throughout the inside of the small courtroom, which has only five rows for
visitors. The Community Court is gradually integrating the latest technologies
into the judicial process; computers sit on every desk and table inside the
courtroom for the judge, the prosecutor, the defense counsel, and others who
help to coordinate the court's activities. 69 Translators sit in the front row,
attentively waiting to assist when they are needed. 7°




165. The following monetary grants, among others, are included in the privately sponsored contribu-
tions to the Community Court:
$600,000 Times Square Business Improvement District
$300,000 New York Telephone
$300,000 New York Times Company Foundation
$300,000 Shubert Foundation
$200,000 Rockefeller Foundation Trust




167. Interview with John Williams, supra note 96.
168. The Community Court has been described as "something of a criminal justice super mall,"
complete with carpeting, computers, bowls of fruit, hot soup, coffee, and paintings on the walls. Jan
Hoffman, A Manhattan Court Explores Service-Oriented Sentencing, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 1993, at A 1.
169. The court will use such technologies as handwriting-reading, document-storing scanning systems,
and statewide data networks. In combination with the court's computer system, these systems will gather
the various types of information and merge it with existing court records to assist judges, prosecutors,
defense attorneys, and court staff in the decisionmaking process. Bob Temliak, Real Estate Update, N.Y.
L.J., Nov. 3, 1993, at 5.
170. One translator, who speaks both Wolof and French, frequently assists the many Senegalese
vendors arraigned for unlicensed vending. Interview with Unidentified Translator at Midtown Community
Court, in New York, N.Y. (Dec. 17, 1993).
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among three Criminal Court judges.17' The court's jurisdiction is limited to
misdemeanor arrests made in two of the city's twenty-one police precincts,
Midtown Precincts North and South.172 In fact, the Community Court is
juxtaposed to the Midtown North police station. This area is affected by all
of the quality-of-life problems that the court is trying to solve. Unlicensed
vending is no exception. Street vendors depend upon the tourist industry, and
the vendors are concentrated geographically in this area precisely because of
the concentration of tourists. They most often work at peak tourist times,
making a high volume of sales shortly before and after nearby theater perfor-
mances.
The developers of the court envision an improved system of justice in five
respects.' 73 First, the Community Court seeks to design sentences that are
both swift and certain. In this way, the developers of the court hope to re-
inforce the message that "crime has consequences."' 74 Second, the Commu-
nity Court aims to make justice more visible. The developers of the court
believe that the court will be accessible to the public, particularly through a
Community Advisory Board. In addition, the work of sentenced offenders
performing community service projects will be visible since they are carried
out in the midtown area-" [d]ispensing justice locally will communicate to both
the lawless and the law-abiding that order prevails and crime will be puni-
shed. ""' Third, the Community Court is expected to encourage police en-
forcement of low-level offenses. By providing constructive sentences for
conviction of these low-level offenses, the Community Court may encourage
greater enforcement efforts. Fourth, the court will integrate local residents and
businesses into the planning and development of solutions to quality-of-life
problems in the Times Square Area. Finally,
[t]he court will understand that communities are victims too. In a centralized court
low-level crimes tend to be seen as isolated incidents rather than as ongoing
quality-of-life conditions. By understanding the magnitude, scope, and nature of
quality-of-life crimes in midtown, the Community Court will be able to address
the neighborhood's problems.'76
The Community Court has jurisdiction over quality-of-life offenses commit-
ted in the Times Square area of Manhattan (the Community Court's "catchment
area"), and it strives to provide immediate disposition of the five categories
171. Interview with Judge Charles Solomon, supra note 127. All of the Community Court's presiding
judges are administrative judges holding supervisory positions. Interview with John Feinblatt, Coordinator,
Midtown Community Court, in New York, N.Y. (Dec. 17, 1993).
172. Hoffman, supra note 97; see supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.






of misdemeanor crimes assigned to it from its catchment area.1" Offenders
who plead not guilty at the Community Court are sent to the Criminal Court
for trial, while felony offenders continue to be processed downtown. 17 The
Community Court is open from 10 a.m. to 5 p.m., Monday through Friday,
and the court generally sees between fifty-five and sixty cases per day, includ-
ing summary arrests and DATs. 79 The court handles all DATs issued in the
catchment area as well as misdemeanor summary arrests made during the hours
between noon and 4 a.m., from Sunday through Thursday. 80 It should be
noted, however, that the court has remained flexible so that if it is determined
that some misdemeanors are not appropriate for processing at the court or that
the hours need to be adjusted, the court will accommodate these changes.18 '
At arrest, offenders are taken directly to a precinct rather than to central
booking. At the precinct, a complaint is drawn and fingerprints are checked.
All offenders are then taken to Midtown Precinct North (MTN) which adjoins
the Community Court. Equipped with holding facilities, MTN has taken on
a new function as a substitute for central booking. It is expected that an
average of twenty-nine defendants will be held at MTN at any given time as
they wait for their paperwork to arrive."8 2 At MTN, Criminal Justice Agency
(CJA) staff members interview defendants in order to complete the newly
devised prearraignment assessment form, which is an expanded version of the
present release-on-recognizance (ROR) intake form used by CJA at central
booking." 3 This new and more detailed assessment instrument focuses on
gathering responses from arrestees regarding substance abuse, homelessness,
177. After eight weeks of operation, the court's catchment area continues to include only Midtown
Precincts North and South. As the court and its procedures become more established, however, the
Community Court expects to arraign offenders brought in from the 10th and Port Authority Police Precincts
as well. Interview with John Williams, supra note 96.
178. Up to 40% of the cases arraigned at the Community Court may be continued at the Criminal
Court as the result of not guilty pleas. Hoffman, supra note 97.
179. Interview with Judge Charles Solomon, supra note 127. Under a "summary arrest" procedure,
the alternative to issuance of a DAT, the defendant is held rather than released for a later court appearance.
180. Community Court Project, supra note 13, at 14. Approximately 50% of Community Court
defendants are expected to be DAT recipients. Id. Arrests made between noon and 4 a.m. constitute
approximately 72% of daily summary arrests. Misdemeanants arrested at other times are arraigned at the
Criminal Court. In addition, because of the Community Court's limited hours, arrests made during the
.crime-heavy weekends" are sent to the Criminal Court to insure that defendants are arraigned within 24
hours after arrest. Hoffman, supra note 168; see supra note 103 and accompanying text.
181. Interview with John Feinblatt, Coordinator, Midtown Community Court, in New York, N.Y.
(Feb. 1, 1993).
182. On Thursdays and Fridays, the busiest days, there will be approximately 35 prisoners. Communi-
ty Court Project, supra note 13, at 2.
183. Interview with John Williams, supra note 96. ROR is a form of pretrial release based on the
arrested person's own promise that he will appear in court at a later date. ROR is used in lieu of a bail
bond when the judge is satisfied that the defendant will appear without the need for security.
The expanded intake form is completed by the defendant on a laptop computer by touching a pencil-
like instrument to the computer's screen. The information is transferred to the main system, and the judge,
prosecutor, and defense attorney are given copies. Interview with John Feinblatt, supra note 171; demon-
stration by CJA Representative at Midtown Community Court, in New York, N.Y. (Dec. 17, 1993).
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health, and qualifications for community service. DAT recipients are inter-
viewed at the court on the date of arraignment.' 8
The Community Court is attempting to quicken the movement of paperwork
at the court by putting all initial arrest information on computers in the pre-
cincts. In this way, when a defendant is moved to MTN, his paperwork will
be sent by computer link. 5 The Community Court is also considering an
expansion of the list of expedited affidavit process (EAP) eligible cases in
order to simplify the transmission of information during arrest procedures." 6
In addition, the Community Court is contemplating a computer link to the court
so that a complaint can be sent directly from the precinct to the court via
computer network. Traditional methods eventually will be replaced by a fully
integrated system of computers for transporting the rap sheet and the com-
plaint.' Although the Community Court has not eliminated paperwork en-
tirely, it is expected to move gradually to a computer-centered system.
C. Sentencing
The essence of the Community Court is that it gives judges an alternative
to jailing or simply releasing quality-of-life offenders. The court's premise is
that the current system lacks appropriately fashioned sanctions, since judges
are forced to dispose of the majority of cases without any jail time.'88 This
is a reflection of the inadequate resources available-in 1990, only 4000 jail
spaces were available for 119,000 convicted misdemeanants.' 89 While the
judge, prosecutor, and defense attorney retain their traditional roles, the
Community Court's staff has made new resources available to them. Although
the new sentencing options are not mandatory and there are no sentencing
guidelines, Judge Charles Solomon believes that the Community Court judges
will be assertive in using those options available to them. 90 He explains that
most judges would rather give a defendant a meaningful sentence, if it is
available, than dismiss the case entirely for lack of space in the city's jails. 9'
In fact, the great majority of offenders at the Community Court do receive one
of the alternative sentences, with only approximately eight percent of the
Community Court offenders being sentenced to jail time.' 92
Sanctions at the Community Court fall into four categories: (1) community
184. Community Court Project, supra note 13, at 2.
185. Interview with John Williams, supra note 96.
186. See supra text accompanying notes 108-09.
187. Interview with John Williams, supra note 96.
188. Interview with Judge Robert G.M. Keating, supra note 5.
189. Subin, supra note 2, at 12.
190. Interview with Judge Charles Solomon, supra note 127.
191. Id.





service, (2) short-term social service intervention, (3) long-term treatment, and
(4) victim/offender reconciliation.193 Most often, an offender receives a
combination of sanctions, such as community service and treatment. Whenever
possible, sanctions are imposed and performed immediately after the disposi-
tion of the case, in order to reduce the risk that a defendant will fail to fulfill
his sentence. Furthermore, a resource coordinating team is on hand to match
defendants with appropriate spaces in community service, drug treatment, and
other social services. The Community Court has worked to provide health
services to defendants; two rooms and three staff members are dedicated to
this task and provide voluntary testing for tuberculosis, H.I.V., and sexually
transmitted diseases. 94 The Community Court strives to provide services and
impose sanctions that meet the needs of the community and individuals ar-
raigned at the court. The court hopes to develop graduated sanctions so that
defendants who are rearrested or fail to comply with their community service
requirement can receive a more severe punishment without necessarily going
to jail. 195
It is important to consider the character and nature of street vendors in
evaluating sentencing alternatives. As long as unlicensed vending remains a
crime, the criminal justice system must strive to accommodate this segment
of offenders. Relative to other convicted criminals, street vendors in New York
City occupy a unique space in the criminal justice system. They are relatively
harmless, and their crime is nonviolent economic activity. Consequently, there
appears to be something of a mismatch between these offenders and the
treatment and sanctions that the Community Court has designed for the more
common misdemeanants. The framework of Community Court sanctions is
ambitious in that it accommodates a large array of crimes and criminals, yet
it does not address the specific needs of the vendors. While further study is
needed to determine the differences between vendors and others arraigned at
the Community Court, and whether there are other, heretofore unconsidered
sanctioning alternatives that may provide a better fit for the vendors, it is
sufficient to note that the nature of the vendors' crime may call for penalties
with more focused economic consequences. The Community Court's sentences
are based upon the premise that alternatives to jail time are needed given the
city's limited resources. The court's approach primarily stresses the criminal
193. Community Court Project, supra note 13, at 4.
194. Hoffman, supra note 168.
195. Community Court Project, supra note 13, at 4. The Community Court's alternative sentencing
scheme does not obviate jail sentences entirely. If a defendant is given an opportunity to participate in social
service treatment or to perform community service and he does not complete it and is later brought before
the court again, the judge can impose a jail sentence. In one case, for example, a Community Court
defendant was sentenced to drug treatment. He dropped out of the treatment, however, after one day. The
same defendant was rearrested for shoplifting and again arraigned in the Community Court. This time, the
judge sentenced him to jail. Matthew Goldstein, Encouraging First Month for Midtown Court, N.Y. L.J.,
Nov. 12, 1993, at 1.
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law goals of deterrence and retribution, although rehabilitation was another
motivation for the creation of the court. The virtual absence of prison sentenc-
es effectively sets aside the goal of incapacitation. The court's rehabilitative-
type sanctions, which include long- and short-term treatment, are not directly
applicable to the vendors as a general rule. Therefore, it seems that if the court
were to focus exclusively on the vendors, community service and other sanc-
tions would be devised with specific deterrent and retributive effects for
economic crimes.
The Community Court's primary innovation is to impose sanctions that
include both social service and community service components. Eighty-two
percent of defendants who plead guilty receive a sanction of community
service, social service, or some combination of the two. ' Although the
court's coordinator acknowledges that the social services aspect is less relevant
to the vendors than to other offenders brought to the court, he maintains that
the community service component of the court's offerings is apposite to the
vendors. 97
The court has attempted to meet the needs of individuals in the provision
of resources and the design of community service projects. In light of the fact
that a significant number of vendors are Senegalese, the court has sought to
meet their special needs by making available English as a Second Language
(ESL) classes. 9 ' Although these classes may be attended by any defendant
who desires to learn English, many vendors are expected to participate. In
addition, the court has sought to insure the vendors' understanding of the
arraignment proceedings by having available on site a translator who speaks
Wolof. And finally, the court's recognition of the presence of many Senegalese
vendors has resulted in the hiring of a Senegalese supervisor for community
service projects.
The following four categories of penalties are administered by the Commu-
nity Court in sanctioning vendors as well as all other misdemeanants generally.
1. Community Service
Less than three decades ago municipal court judges in Alameda County,
California, began to use community service sentences as punishment.'99 Since
that time, community service gradually has become more popular with judges,
and "with increasing frequency, judges are fashioning community service
sentences on their own, without having specially organized programs in their
196. Interview with John Feinblatt, supra note 171.
197. Telephone Interview with John Feinblatt, supra note 10.
198. Participation in ESL classes may be voluntary or court-mandated. Id.
199. DOuGLAs CORRY MCDONALD, PUNISHMENT WITHOUT WALLS 7 (1986).
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localities."'2° The Community Court has joined the trend toward using com-
munity service as a distinct penal sanction; community service is the gravamen
of the Community Court. No longer are judges required to rely on their own
devices to see that community service is carried out. Rather, the court has
created an organized, comprehensive framework through which offenders
routinely are sentenced to a variety of community service projects. 0 1
The notion of community service as an alternative punishment is consistent
with the community policing idea, as offenders are compelled to give back to
the community from which they have taken. Low-level offenders, such as those
arraigned at the Community Court, create a unique opportunity in sentencing.
These defendants can be productive without posing a significant threat to the
community. Offenders sentenced at the Community Court are assigned to
perform their service for the same neighborhoods in which they committed
their crime. In addition, those sanctioned with community service wear uni-
forms that identify them as wards of the court while they perform their duties,
thus making them visible to neighborhood residents.20 2
There are at least three advantages to community service as compared with
other sentencing schemes.2 3 First, community service engages offenders who
can do something productive for the community, allowing the city to save the
money that it would otherwise use to incarcerate them. Second, community
service embraces the notion of restorative justice, because offenders are forced
to see the consequences of their actions for the community and to pay the
community back. Finally, community service, through its visibility, may
increase community satisfaction. Increased community satisfaction is a result
of the feeling among community members that the government is responsive
to their concerns about crime and disorder.
A principal mission of the Community Court is to increase sentencing
options that do not require use of the state's limited jail space. Community
service sentences are available to most misdemeanants at the Community
Court, and they can accommodate varying degrees of supervision and skill.
This flexibility allows the court to tailor a sentence to an individual, increasing
the likelihood that the community service will actually be completed. A
particular defendant's suitability for a certain type of community service is
200. Id. at 10.
201. Memorandum from John Feinblatt, Coordinator, Midtown Community Court, to Jerry McElroy,
Preliminary Discussion of Assessments at the Community Court 1 (Mar. 11, 1992) (on file with author).
202. Interview with Jeanelle Farris, supra note 52. Community service crews wear blue mesh vests
with a yellow-green Community logo. Hoffman, supra note 168.
203. One shortcoming of community service is that it does not directly seek to remedy the intractability
of the behavior. Arguably, the ultimate goal of the criminal justice process should be to curb this behavior
altogether. Most of the offenders arraigned at the Community Court are repeat offenders, yet community
service sanctions may not change behavioral patterns. One convicted prostitute at the Community Court
exclaimed: "'Making whores work? I got 49 convictions! You think stuffing envelopes for a few days is
going to stop me?'" This sentiment is not atypical. Hoffman, supra note 168.
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determined by his responses to the expanded prearraignment assessment form.
The factors considered include: crime type, prior record, prior warrant history,
skills, mental health, physical health, DAT or summary arrest status, and
previous cooperation with community service sanctions.
The community service sanctions are divided into roughly three levels of
supervision. Defendants who need minimal supervision are assigned to off-site
community service jobs with small nonprofit and grassroots organizations. For
defendants requiring a greater degree of supervision, there are closely super-
vised projects off-site that are managed by trained staff. These projects include
repairing or cleaning a subway station under the supervision of the Transit
Authority, 2' participating in Feeding the Homeless supervised by the Holy
Apostles' Soup Kitchen, and sorting redeemable cans supervised by WE
CAN.2 5 For defendants needing the highest degree of supervision, the final
category of community service sanctions consists of closely supervised, on-site
projects that are performed within the confines of the courthouse itself. These
sanctions are reserved for offenders who are considered unlikely to complete
a project. Projects range from bulk mailing for "Operation Mailbox," a service
for not-for-profit organizations, to cleaning the courthouse building.2' A
court representative/CASES staff member is available at the court to coordinate
the various community service sanctions and to implement them as soon as
possible after sentencing.
The Community Court disposes of approximately seventy-five percent of
its daily caseload through the acceptance of guilty pleas; not guilty pleas
comprise approximately twenty-five percent of pleas, both at the Community
Court and downtown.2 7 With an average of fifty-eight cases a day, the court
strives to make available community service opportunities for each of the
approximately forty-one offenders to be sanctioned. In fact, seventy-one
percent of offenders receive community service as a sanction.2 8 Because the
court has been open for only a short time, the exact composition and schedule
of community services is still being molded to fit the court's needs. The court's
developers have determined that if each defendant who pleads guilty were to
be sanctioned to community service, the court would need a daily capacity of
seventy-six "slots" to accommodate all offenders. The daily allocation of the
slots is expected to be the following: sixteen slots for prostitutes and the
homeless, who will generally be given one day sentences; ten slots for one
offender per day who would be eligible for CASES' seventy-hour Community
Service Sentencing Project; and fifty slots to accommodate community service
204. Memorandum from John Feinblatt to Jerry McElroy, supra note 201, at 1.
205. Midtown Community Court Project, Chart A: Community Service (1992) (on file with author).






sanctions in the remaining twenty-five cases that would average two days
each.2t 9
The court's community service programs have had an admirable success
rate. Only approximately twenty percent of the offenders mandated to perform
community service at the Community Court do not show up for their work;
this is in stark contrast to the sixty percent of offenders who do not appear
downtown.210 In addition, nearly all offenders sanctioned to do community
service by the Community Court complete their sentence by fulfilling all work
requirements. This high rate of completion may be attributed to the careful
consideration of an individual offender's needs and the array of community
service projects with different degrees of supervision. An additional explana-
tion lies in the immediacy of the sanction; the court places all defendants
within twenty-four hours of their arraignment. 21  Not only can offenders
complete a full day of community service on the day of their arraignment, but
they can also work on the weekends to fulfill their community service require-
ment.212
Vendors are typically sentenced to between one and four days of communi-
ty service by the Community Court. 2 3 A typical vendor's sentence includes
work on Ninth Avenue cleaning the street and painting fire hydrants, lamp
posts, and security fronts.2 14 Early indicators demonstrate that community
service is well-suited to most vendors. In fact, the Community Court's Coordi-
nator, John Feinblatt, has observed that the vendors are especially responsible
as a group, resulting in a high success rate for their participation in community
service projects. This finding is critical to the court's success: Strict enforce-
ment, measured by attendance and performance, is essential to critics' accep-
tance of the community service sentence. Preliminary figures indicate that
vendors have about a ninety-three percent completion rate for community
service-the highest completion rate of any group at the court.21 5
209. Community Court Project, supra note 13, at 4.
210. Interview with John Feinblatt, supra note 171; see Goldstein, supra note 195.
211. Goldstein, supra note 195.
212. If the judge is aware that a defendant sentenced to community service has a job during the week,
she may advise the defendant that he can perform his community service on the weekend. Moreover, if
the defendant has already lost a day of work on the day of his arraignment, he can do one day of his
community service on that day.
213. Telephone Interview with John Feinblatt, supra note 10.
214. Id.
215. Other community service completion rates for the court's first seven weeks of operation are the
following: 70% for petty larceny, 73% for prostitution, and 80% for theft of services. Id.
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2. Short-Term Social Service Interventions
Short-term, on-site treatment services have been developed for defendants
not sentenced to serve any time in jail.21 At arraignment, the judge has a
copy of the extended release-on-recognizance intake form that the defendant
has completed. If appropriate, the judge may suggest or require that the
defendant take advantage of available services that include health services, drug
treatment, job referrals, and housing assistance.2 7 In fact, the Community
Court houses twenty-six social service organizations that provide services to
offenders at the court. 218 Short-term social service interventions focus on
small groups, and each group is comprised of a particular category of defen-
dants. Groups receiving such targeted services include drug users and addicts,
prostitutes, and the homeless.219
3. Long-Term Treatment
Defendants sentenced to serve time in jail may be ordered to attend drug
or alcohol treatment programs. 220 Long-term treatment programs include:
(1) a residential program of at least ninety days for offenders who have failed
in outpatient programs but have not been in a residential facility; (2) an
outpatient program of between sixty and ninety days; (3) an acupuncture
program for substance abusing offenders for a minimum of thirty days; and
(4) a program designed for offenders at high risk of contracting tuberculosis
216. Memorandum from John Feinblatt to Jerry McElroy, supra note 201, at 2.
217. The need for social services by the offenders arraigned at the Community Court is readily
apparent. A 1990 study by the National Institute of Justice reported that over 70% of the offenders to be
arraigned at the Criminal Court tested positive for illegal drugs. Community Court Project, supra note 13,
at 6. A profile of defendants in MTS, MTN, and the 10th Precinct between 1987 and 1991 reveals the
following:
* 41.9% have neither a high school degree nor a GED equivalent
* 56.5% are unemployed or have an illegal occupation
* 79.7% have used marijuana, 62.8% have used cocaine, 50.6% have used crack cocaine, 34.3%
have used heroin
* 34.3% say they need drug treatment
* 71.9% tested positive by voluntary urinalysis for cocaine
Midtown Community Court Project, Education, Employment, and Substance Abuse Data for Community
Court Defendants (n.d.) (compiling data produced by NDRI, Drug Use Forecasting System) (on file with
author).
Ironically, the easily-accessed social service treatment available at the Community Court is made
available only to criminals and not to the population at large. Many New York City residents have only
limited access to treatment. Given the fact that there are only 5500 treatment beds in New York City, one
might question the appropriateness of this allocation. Interview with Judge Robert G.M. Keating, supra
note 5. This allocation of resources becomes troubling when the nexus between the crime and the punish-
ment-such as a "punishment" that grants coveted space in a drug treatment program-is too tenuous. On
the other hand, the Community Court does not operate an outreach program, so the question remains: Once
individuals enter the system that has these resources available, what is the reason not to treat them?
218. Goldstein, supra note 195.
219. Midtown Community Court Project, Chart C: Daily On-Site Services (1992) (on file with author).
220. Memorandum from John Feinblatt to Jerry McElroy, supra note 201, at 2.
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or the AIDS virus.221
4. Victim/Offender Reconciliation
Although the Community Court has not yet implemented the vic-
tim/offender reconciliation sanction, a mediation program is being explor-
ed.222 For crimes with identifiable victims, reconciliation sessions may be
held between victims and offenders or between community groups and offend-
ers. The goal of such a sanction would be to demonstrate to the offender the
concrete consequences of his actions. It would further require the offender to
take personal responsibility for his crime. In some instances, it may even be
possible to provide restitution of sorts. 22
Victim/offender reconciliation is less appropriate for unlicensed vendors
than for other misdemeanants at the court. Unlike petit larceny cases, unli-
censed vending presents no easily identifiable victim. Furthermore, unlicensed
vending is unlike other crimes, such as prostitution and drug dealing, in that
it is primarily economic in nature. It is difficult to identify direct victims of
unlicensed vending. Should reconciliation be fostered with individual residents?
storeowners? pedestrians? the city tax department? the Fifth Avenue Associa-
tion? Given the unique impact of this crime on New York neighborhoods,
victim/offender reconciliation is unlikely to be an effective sanction for vending
offenders.
Another innovation proposed by the Community Court-community impact
panels-might be more appropriate for vendors. These panels would be
designed "to communicate to the defendant the cost that crime inflicts on a
neighborhood," 224 and they would give community representatives the oppor-
tunity to express the neighborhood's problems and concerns to the defendants.
Community impact panels might be appropriate for victimless crimes, and the
defendants that come before such panels may agree to perform community
service.
IV. MIXED SUCCESS
The Community Court is an ambitious experiment in neighborhood justice,
and the developers of the court have not been afraid to think radically to meet
the call for change. A reform of this magnitude will inevitably encounter
221. Id. The acupuncture program must be entered voluntarily by defendants. Telephone Interview
with John Feinblatt, supra note 192.
222. Interview with John Feinblatt, supra note 171.
223. Memorandum from John Feinblatt to Jerry McElroy, supra note 201, at 2.
224. Community Court Project, supra note 13, at 10.
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obstacles, and despite the enthusiasm of the court's developers, the court poses
several problems. For the moment, some of these problems appear academic,
yet they are real and present dangers to the court and its defendants. Most of
the problems relate to implementation of the court's unique approach to
criminal justice administration for low-level quality-of-life crimes. The court
seeks to create a fabric of broad-based community service programs that can
accommodate nearly all defendants, thus meeting a need that had previously
gone unmet; however, some of the procedures by which the court attempts to
reach this goal are troubling.
A. Community Service Sanctions
The essence of the Community Court's three-year experiment is its commu-
nity service sanctions. This aspect of the court should be embraced by both
"the right and left of [the] crime control" 225 community. 'Controversy gener-
ally has surrounded the appropriateness of community service as an alternative
to traditional sentencing-while the right favors stiffer penalties for offenders,
the left advocates reduced reliance on jails and an expansion of the use of
substitute punishments.226 The Community Court, however, functions in a
unique environment, and the usual circumstances leading to disagreement
between right and left are not present. Community service, in the context of
the Community Court, should reconcile these points of view.
Offenders who are sentenced to community service by the Community
Court would otherwise routinely be given time served in the Criminal Court.
Rather than serving as a substitute for jail, community service sanctions in the
Community Court are filling a space where virtually nothing existed before.
This is especially true in the case of unlicensed vendors since a significant
number of vendors are given DATs at arrest and therefore serve no time at
all. Due to the difficulties of administering criminal justice in urban areas,
crimes brought to the Community Court-unlicensed vending, prostitution,
fare-beating, minor drug offenses, and petit larceny and criminal possession
of stolen property-are crimes for which convicted offenders are released after
arraignment. For this reason, liberals should be satisfied that this is a fair
alternative to overcrowded jails, and conservatives should recognize that
community service is better than no sanction at all.
225. Norval Morris, Foreword to McDONALD, supra note 199, at xiii.
226. McDONALD, supra note 199, at 2.
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B. Balance of Power
If the parties involved in the Midtown Community Court resist the new
system, the changes may become more symbolic than realized. The key issue
is whether the preexisting balance of power between prosecutors and judges
will be disturbed. Charles Grau's study of the Travis County Courts-at-Law
in Austin, Texas, is a good example of judicial sentencing reform that "threat-
en[ed] to reorganize existing relationships, preferences, and behavior" of
critical actors in the criminal justice process. 227 The court's central change
was the introduction of Community Service Restitution (CSR) as an alternative
to a fine or jail term for misdemeanants. The goal of CSR, like that of the
Community Court, was to reintegrate misdemeanants into the community. In
the Austin case, prosecutors resisted the reform because it would have changed
the balance of power. Before CSR, the judge generally accepted sentencing
recommendations by the prosecutor; after the change, the prosecutor was
denied that sentencing discretion.228 Ultimately, "program implementation
was stymied" because the change threatened to alter drastically existing
working and political relationships between judges and prosecutors, among
others .229
In another study on community service sentencing alternatives, the Vera
Institute determined that the allocation of authority for screening and sentencing
decisions significantly affected the court's reform initiatives." 0 Where the
selection of potential sentences was judge-centered, rather than prosecutor-
centered, more offenders were given community service; on the other hand,
where the dominant position was held by the district attorneys' offices, "prose-
cutors used their power to restrict the sentencing of jailbound offenders to
community service."" The Vera Institute made the following findings: (1)
the person designated to make the initial decisions regarding eligibility for
community service sentencing is important in the ultimate acceptance of
community service as a real and important alternative; and (2) where the
defense attorney decides which cases a judge should consider for community
service, more offenders were actually given such a sentence. 2
Although the sentencing changes instituted by the Community Court have
the potential to disrupt the balance of power between the judge and prosecutor,
227. Charles W. Grau, The Limits of Planned Change in Courts, JUST. Sys. J., Spring 1981, at 84,
90.
228. Id. at 91.
229. Id.
230. This study by the Vera Institute of Justice examined what happened when community service
sanctions were introduced into three different New York City courts between 1979 and 1981. McDONALD,
supra note 199, at 1.
231. Id. at 75.
232. Id.
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this potential has not been realized. A consideration of Grau's study might
predict that the Community Court's changes would effect a shift of sentencing
discretion from prosecutor to judge, because, in fact, the prosecutor holds a
dominant position in the Community Court. 3 Because the prosecutor would
have no real negotiating power if the defendant were to plead to the top
charge, the prosecutor generally makes an offer to a reduced charge, which
typically consists of an ACD and a certain number of days of community ser-
vice.? The defendant is free to accept or reject the offer of community
service, and he can, of course, plead not guilty. Although the judge receives
more information through the expanded interview form, and could potentially
take a more active role in the process, in most cases the judge agrees with the
prosecutor's offer, which usually includes community service. Thus, sentencing
authority is de facto delegated to the prosecutor. In practice, if not in theory,
the Community Court has not had a major impact on the balance of power,
and community service already has become a routine and predictable part of
sanctioning.
Community service sanctions are likely to gain gradual acceptance as an
established part of the Community Court's proceedings. First, unlike the
reform studied by the Vera Institute, the Community Court has not limited
eligibility for community service sentencing. Because the court envisions that
nearly all offenders can be accommodated by the spectrum of available com-
munity service projects, all Community Court offenders are eligible for
community service. Second, in contrast to the findings of the Vera Institute,
prosecutors do not appear to have used their power to limit the imposition of
community service sentences by the court, notwithstanding their dominance
in the Community Court. The reason seems clear: From the prosecutor's
perspective, the imposition of some sanction is better than no punishment at
all, and many of these defendants would otherwise have been sentenced to time
served. Thus, from the outset, both Community Court judges and the District
Attorney's Office appear to appreciate the availability and benefits of commu-
nity service as a meaningful sanction.
C. Due Process Concerns
The Community Court has attempted to "match" the scope of the pre-
arraignment assessment questionnaire to its expected uses. The intake form
233. Telephone Interview with John Williams, supra note 12.
234. See N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 170.55(2) (McKinney 1992). Upon issuing an order of ACD
(adjournment and contemplation of dismissal), combined with a sentence of a specific number of days of
community service, the court must release the defendant on his own recognizance. The judge adjourns the
case for six months. If the defendant completes his community service and commits no other crimes during





may, however, ask for more information than is really necessary. At a mini-
mum, court officials must insure that the specific purposes of the assessment
form are clearly defined and limited and that the information received is used
for those stated purposes only.
Although issues involving prearraignment assessment forms have not arisen
frequently in reported case law, those cases that are reported demonstrate that
great care must be taken in releasing the information gathered during the initial
intake interview. In New York, the use of information gathered by the Crimi-
nal Justice Agency (CJA) in the prearraignment stage has generated controver-
sy since some prosecutors have attempted to use it for purposes other than
those directly related to release of the defendant. The central question ad-
dressed by these cases is this: "Can information obtained directly from a
defendant-without Miranda warnings and in the absence of counsel-for use
on arraignment in determining eligibility for recognizance or bail release, be
employed against the defendant at trial?"" 5 In People v. Brown,236 the pros-
ecution subpoenaed a CJA employee to testify to statements given by the
defendant in a prearraignment interview that was conducted "for bail or
recognizance release" purposes. The information in issue, defendant's marital
status and place of residence, was obtained from the defendant without a
Miranda warning and in absence of counsel. Consequently, the New York
Supreme Court held that the information was not admissible for purposes of
the prosecution's affirmative case against the defendant. The court ruled,
however, that the information would be admissible on cross examination if it
were directed to the defendant's credibility.
The holding in Brown was at least partially driven by the court's interest
in creating and preserving an environment that would allow the CJA interview
program to succeed. The Brown court declared that a primary goal of the
procedure should be "to secure the full and honest cooperation of the inter-
viewees and to provide thereby complete and candid information to the
court."" 7 In Brown, it appeared that defendants were being told that their
cooperation during the prearraignment interview was "essential to a favorable
recommendation" to the judge in connection with their bail or recognizance
application and that "their statements [could] be used against them if they
violate[d] any release conditions."" The New York Supreme Court ob-
served that, given these warnings, defendants undoubtedly were less likely to
be willing to answer the questions candidly. Consequently, the court recog-
nized that "[tihe detrimental effect of such a reaction on the defendants them-
selves and on the entire CJA program is clear, and the heretofore innumerable
235. People v. Brown, 438 N.Y.S.2d 955, 955 (Sup. Ct. 1981).
236. Id.
237. Id. at 957.
238. Id.
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successes of the ROR plan will be consequently and substantially re-
duced."" Finally, the court concluded that "all statements secured from a
defendant during this prearraignment interrogation process should be barred
from purely affirmative use by the People on both their direct and rebuttal
cases. "24
0
In its holding, the New York Supreme Court in Brown specifically noted
that the nature of the information sought by CJA went "far beyond the mere
pedigree information secured by arresting officers during the 'booking' proce-
dures." 241 If the prosecution were permitted to use release-on-recognizance
(ROR) intake statements against a defendant in its affirmative case, an absence
of preliminary warnings would violate a defendant's constitutional rights.242
In short, the use of this information by the district attorney would probably
require adequate Miranda warnings. Also at work in Brown was the notion that
a defendant, by verbally attempting to exercise the constitutional right to be
free from excessive bail,243 may be deprived of the right to remain si-
lent.2"4
The limited findings of the court in Brown are generally consistent with
the views of the Supreme Court of Minnesota, the only other state that has
directly considered this issue. In State v. Winston,245 the court held that it
was error for the prosecution to call a probation officer to testify regarding
information given during an interview, the purpose of which was to arrange
bail. Although the particular circumstances of this case did not render this
conduct prejudicial, 24 the court emphasized that continuing the practice of
calling probation officers to testify regarding information given at bail-setting
interviews would seriously jeopardize the interview program.247 In sum, the
court stated that "such evidence given to the probation officer ... cannot be
used in the prosecution of. . . defendants."248
In combination, these two cases indicate that the Community Court must
be careful in releasing information obtained from defendants for release-
specific purposes. Because the prearraignment assessment form of the Commu-
nity Court is created for rather expansive purposes, the court must take steps
to avoid potential conflicts. The standard ROR interview form completed at
central booking is distributed to the court, prosecution, and defense before
arraignment. The new, expanded assessment form used by the Community
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 958.
242. Id. (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)).
243. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; N.Y. CONST., art. I, § 5.
244. U.S. CONST. amend. V; N.Y. CONST., art. I, § 6.
245. 219 N.W.2d 617 (Minn. 1974).






Court is also distributed to each of these participants, and the information is
used as a guide in sentencing offenders to community and social service as well
as in referring individuals to the many services available at the court. The
distribution of this form, however, may give rise to questions of how the
information gathered can be used against the defendant at trial should a defen-
dant plead not guilty and be sent downtown to the Criminal Court for trial,
raising the very issues identified in Brown.
The Community Court has instituted what has been described by the court's
coordinator as a Miranda-type warning given to each defendant at the outset
of each intake interview by CJA. This may not be enough, however, because
each defendant is interviewed before having the opportunity. to meet with an
attorney. The court should consider further measures to assure that the infor-
mation gathered is not used improperly. There are several options to consider
in taking steps to avoid the problems raised in Brown and Winston. First, the
District Attorney's Office could enter a standard agreement that the information
received through the expanded interview will not be used to compromise the
defendant's rights through an abuse of the prearraignment assessment form.
Second, the defense attorney could be given some degree of control over the
distribution of the information gathered during the interview. A third option,
and one that might be the least problematic, would be to have two separate
interview forms. In other words, it might be possible to maintain the ROR
form as it exists downtown and to keep the expanded portion separate in order
to avoid later problems. The separation of the form into two parts might only
be useful if the district attorney were precluded from gaining access to the
expanded form.
D. Funding Concerns and Replication of the Community Court
Not surprisingly, the proliferation of street peddlers on Fifth Avenue has
caused outrage among legitimate merchants. These merchants, united in the
Fifth Avenue Association, have claimed that the peddlers steal business, evade
taxes, create litter and garbage, and destroy the ambiance of the exclusive
avenue. The Fifth Avenue Association and its members have vigorously
supported the development of the Community Court. The group's interest,
however, raises troubling questions about the acceptability of private financial
contributions to the public state court system.
The Fifth Avenue Association has a powerful interest in the success of the
Community Court. The Association hopes that the court will rid the area of
some of its present evils. Because the members of the Fifth Avenue Associa-
tion represent one of the city's most important economic interests, City offi-
cials listen and respond to the merchants' concerns to insure that they do not
move from the area. This group.in particular has long been antagonistic to
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vendors and is responsible for much of the law dealing with unlicensed vend-
ing. For example, the Association led the campaign to reverse an April 1990
court ruling in Kaswan v. Aponte,249 which exempted disabled veterans from
municipal laws prohibiting most street vending in midtown. In effect, Kaswan
permitted disabled veterans to vend free of the time, place, and manner
restrictions in the city. In September 1991, the state legislature, with the strong
backing of the Fifth Avenue Association, passed legislation that essentially
negated the effect of Kaswan in New York City; the legislative amendment
to the 1894 law now excludes cities with more than one million residents from
the provision exempting disabled veterans."5
The Fifth Avenue Association has not hesitated to join in the latest battle
against New York City vendors through the development of the Community
Court. Although the peddlers are not the only, or even the largest, problem
facing Fifth Avenue, their reduced presence likely will have other positive
effects. After the Association's victory following Kaswan, merchants hoped
that a decrease in the number of vending tables would make it easier for police
to see other participants in illegal activity, such as three-card monte dealers
and unlicensed watch salesmen.25'
The Fifth Avenue Association has made a significant financial investment
in the Community Court. The fact that strong private interests are making
significant financial contributions to the court has caused many criminal justice
officials to voice questions about the propriety of such contributions. Many
of the people interviewed expressed their concern that the court was the direct
result of a rich special interest buying its own system of justice. Recognizing
the financial role that the area's businesses have played in the founding of the
court, one critic charged that the court's existence could only be explained as
the work of "a few powerful people who want their own court," because, in
his view, all other factors militate against the court's development. 2 The
Community Court's coordinator, John Feinblatt, argues that private contribu-
tions are necessary to begin any intervention into the present system." He
also points out that these private funds were not diverted from another part of
the criminal justice system. Nonetheless, the Community Court's private
funding raises questions of propriety. Not only must the criminal justice system
be fair, it must appear to be fair in order not to jeopardize the public's faith
and confidence in the system. The appearance of the "privatization" of crimi-
nal justice in New York City should be cause for concern.5 4
249. 553 N.Y.S.2d 407 (Sup. Ct. 1990).
250. Theresa Agovino, Ruling Restores Fifth Ave. Luster, CRAIN'S N.Y. Bus., Sept. 16, 1991, at 4.
251. Id.
252. Interview with Paul Shechtman, supra note 128.
253. Interview with John Feinblatt, supra note 171.
254. The Community Court's annual budget is $1.1 million. Lynette Holloway, Neighborhood Report:
Red Hook; Community Court Planned, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1993, § 13, at 10.
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The nature of the court's funding has also stirred concern that the judges
on the court will feel accountable to the large merchants in the area and conse-
quently will impose harsher sentences than they otherwise would. The preser-
vation of "an independent, fair and competent judiciary" is of the utmost
importance to our legal system." Canon One of the Model Code of Judicial
Conduct dictates that a judge shall uphold the integrity and independence of
the judiciary, for "[a]n independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable
to justice in our society." 6 In fact, the commentary to Canon One notes that
the independence of judges turns upon their acting "without fear or favor."
Furthermore, the commentary to Canon Two of the Model Code specifically
notes that a judge is to avoid not only all impropriety but also any appearance
of impropriety. In the past, the Chief Administrative Judge of the New York
State Courts, Leo Milonas, resisted special purpose tribunals altogether because
he believes that courts need to maintain a sense of impartiality with a "cool"
environment and not a "hot" environment plagued by special interests.7
Ultimate success for the Community Court would entail the adoption of
its theory and methods in other areas of New York and other cities. If the cost
is bearable in other areas, the Community Court may be "a first step in
breaking up the city's large, gasping criminal justice system into small, local
courts." 8 However, the cost of establishing similar courts is not insignifi-
cant. In fact, if other communities are unable to bear this cost, one must
question the Community Court's "fairness to poor communities that cannot
afford to sponsor such an innovation."" The success of the Community
Court would then appear to be attributable to a "rich community buying its
own court system."26 Other impediments to the court's replication exist as
well. In order to expand this program, the centralized system would have to
post judges, clerks, and other court services around the city. Eventually, this
would drain the Criminal Court's resources and hamper the system. In fact,
participants in the Community Court's development have admitted that "[t]he
whole thing is money."261
By the end of 1993, the possibility of replicating the Community Court in
other areas of New York City began to transform into a reality. A planning
committee has been formed to work on the establishment of a community court
in the Red Hook area of Brooklyn,262 and the 1994-95 budget plan for court
255. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT pmbl. (1990).
256. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 1 (1990).
257. Interview with Judge E. Leo Milonas, Chief Administrative Judge of the New York State Courts,
in New York, N.Y. (Dec. 14, 1992).
258. Hoffman, supra note 97.
259. Blumenthal, supra note 7, at Al.
260. Interview with Nina Epstein, supra note 32.
261. Id.
262. Telephone Interview with John Feinblatt, supra note 10.
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operations proposes the creation of this second community court, to be mod-
eled on the Community Court, at the Red Hook housing projects.263 The
court is scheduled to open in the spring of 1994 and will be designed to meet
the specific needs of its community. 2' In contrast to the Community Court's
focus on transient criminals in Times Square, this court will be aimed at
"hometown criminals" who are responsible for the "fear, drugs and guns that
have long been part of the landscape of [the Red Hook housing projects]." 26 5
This court will also be a three-year experiment. The court will process low-
level misdemeanors similar to those processed by the Community Court, but
it will also offer additional services, including a civil court, a family court,
and a night court for nonjury criminal trials. Arraignments likely will take
place from the precincts via video monitors. In addition, a "team of defenders"
is expected to be assigned to the court so that they may become more familiar
with the neighborhood.
As might be expected, one obstacle impeding the Red Hook court's ability
to get off the ground is funding. Officials are still seeking both public and
private funds for the court. Thus far, the United States Justice Department has
provided a grant of $150,000 to help organize the court, and organizers have
applied for a grant of $125,000 from the New York City Housing Authority
to develop construction plans.266 The Red Hook community's difficulty in
finding sufficient funds is not unexpected. Rather, this community's frustration
emphasizes the unique position of the Community Court and highlights the
privileged nature of its funding. If other neighborhood communities across
New York are unable to finance a community court and funding is not avail-
able from the city, efforts to replicate the Community Court will not succeed.
E. Equality in Sentencing
The Community Court raises questions of fairness by giving similar
defendants committing similar crimes different sentences.267 Though perhaps
unintentional, the sentences imposed by judges at the Community Court are
harsher than those imposed by judges at 100 Centre Street for like offenses.
In essence, the Community Court's sentencing structure creates a problem of
horizontal equity. For example, if two people are arrested for peddling goods
without licenses a block apart, one within the catchment area of the Communi-
ty Court and the other outside of it, they will be arraigned in different courts.
263. Gary Spencer, Court Seeks $902 Million Budget; Askfor Better Courthouse Security; New Phones
Computers for Judges, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 3, 1993, at 1.
264. Holloway, supra note 254.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Interview with Frank P. Witty III, Staff Attorney, The Legal Aid Society, Criminal Defense
Division, in New York, N.Y. (Dec. 17, 1993); see Hoffman, supra note 168.
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The offender arrested outside of the Community Court's catchment area will
be sent to 100 Centre Street and will probably receive either a fine or a
sentence of time served. In contrast, the offender arrested in the Times Square
Area will be arraigned at the Community Court and, upon the entering of a
guilty plea, likely will be given a sentence that involves community service
and some sort of counseling, depending upon the information that has been
gathered through the expanded prearraignment assessment form. Thus, the
vendor arraigned at the Community Court and sentenced to community service
and treatment will be in the state's custody for a longer period of time than
the vendor who is required only to pay a fine.
The Community Court has established a "separate but unequal system"268
in which people are treated differently based upon the fortuity of the location
of their arrest combined with the intangibles identified during an interview.
This kind of blatant disparity in sentencing does not exist in the federal sys-
tem,269 where, at least in theory, the punishment is designed to fit the crime
and not the location of the offense.270 John Feinblatt agrees that the court
creates a sentencing disparity. He argues that while Community Court sentenc-
es for lesser offenses are harsher, less jail time is imposed on more serious
offenders, making those sanctions less severe than the ones received down-
town. Ultimately, Feinblatt explains that this sentencing framework imposes
real, intermediate sanctions.271
In part, the greater severity of the sentences at the Community Court arises
from the expanded intake forms administered by representatives of CJA and
filled out by all defendants appearing in court. This newly revised prearraign-
ment assessment form supplies the judge with more information about the
individual defendant than would be received were the defendant arraigned
downtown at the Criminal Court.272 In this way, the judge is able to make
a reasoned choice with respect to community service and treatment alternatives.
In tailoring sanctions to the criminals as individuals, however, a degree of
unfairness is built into the system. Because the Community Court system asks
268. Interview with Nina Epstein, supra note 32.
269. Even in the federal system, local discretion may affect prosecutorial choices despite the existence
of the federal sentencing guidelines. Because crime and resources vary across federal districts, there may
be occasions on which such discretion is justifiable. See, e.g., William Braniff, Local Discretion, Prosecuto-
rial Choices and the Sentencing Guidelines, 5 FED. SENTENCINiG REP. 309 (1993).
270. Interview with Nina Epstein, supra note 32.
271. Some degree of unequal sentencing is already built into the New York criminal justice system.
For example, the city has five district attorneys, each with its own policies. Therefore, a peddler in
Manhattan may receive different treatment than a peddler in Queens by virtue of geographical divisions.
Telephone Interview with John Feinblatt, supra note 10.
272. Informal mechanisms in the Community Court may also supply the judge with supplementary
information. For example, because only three judges rotate to preside at arraignment, it is highly likely
that they will see individual peddlers, as well as other offenders, numerous times. In fact, after less than
two months of the court's operation, many defendants had already been arraigned at the Community Court
two or three times for the same charges. Hoffman, supra note 168. Because street peddlers do not have
rap sheets, a judge's memory may be the only indication that an individual peddler is a repeat offender.
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how to provide services and sanctions to best help a particular individual, other
individuals who have committed the same crime are necessarily treated differ-
ently downtown. Although the court has only been open for a short time,
defense lawyers are well aware of the inequities posed by the Community
Court and its sentencing scheme. What does this mean? It means that vendors
and other misdemeanants are being advised to stay downtown.273
Despite this sentencing problem, some judges believe that additional
information will benefit previously ignored defendants by making possible
alternative sanctions, such as mandatory drug treatment.274 Viewed in this
way, the unfairness of increased severity in sentencing does not become a
problem, because it is perceived that defendants are actually being helped.275
But consider another example. If two persons commit petty theft and one is
also a drug addict, part of the latter defendant's sanction in the Community
Court may involve lengthy drug treatment. Although the defendant's participa-
tion in such a program is intended to be in his own interest, the perception is
that he is subject to an added burden by being placed under state control for
significantly longer than someone who committed the same crime but does not
have a dependency problem. Irrespective of the benefits to the defendants as
individuals, paternalistic ideas of assistance may not be enough to trump
notions of equity.
Moreover, we should consider whether it makes sense to send unlicensed
vendors or other defendants to rehabilitation or social services at all. If a
vendor or any other misdemeanant has a drug problem, the Community Court
judge may sentence the offender to participate in some type of social service
or other drug treatment program. In some instances, the virtual lack of nexus
between the crime committed and the punishment imposed makes the imposi-
tion of such a sanction troubling at best. Furthermore, what action is the court
273. When one unlicensed street vendor who had been arrested multiple times asked where to peddle
his rubber spiders and motorized mice, his lawyer advised him to "'stay downtown'" since he likely would
be arrested again. Id.
The inequities presented by the Community Court may not be limited to defendants. The Manhattan
District Attorney's Office has noticed that prosecutors, too, have a sense of inequity: "'They work in a
building downtown where defendants and witnesses can't use the bathrooms because they're so filthy, and
then they work in a midtown building with acupuncture and hot soup for the defendants.'" Id. (quoting
Paul Shechtman, former Counsel to the District Attorney).
274. Interview with Judge Robert G.M. Keating, supra note 5. One Community Court judge has
observed that part of what she does is " ' facilitat[e] some social work.'" Goldstein, supra note 195 (quoting
Judge Judy Harris Kluger).
275. Interviewees who found the resulting inequities in sentencing acceptable had various reasons,
most of them based upon the Community Court's intent to help these defendants. Alternative sanctions may
be viewed as a humanitarian approach to meting out justice on these criminal defendants. Interview with
Judge Charles Solomon, supra note 127. In some ways, mandatory therapy and treatment are not "sanc-
tions" at all; rather, mandatory treatment demonstrates concern for these individuals' well-being. Interview
with Gerald Shoenfeld and Herb Sturz, supra note 12. One judge went so far as to suggest that "perhaps
it should be happening this way at 100 Centre Street, too." Interview with Judge Charles Solomon, supra
note 127. One interviewee characterized the inequities as a necessary risk of change, explaining only that
"the law is often an ass." Interview with William H. Daly, supra note 18.
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to take if the defendant does not complete the mandated treatment? Should the
court now send him to jail when it probably was not prepared to send the
defendant to jail for the crime in the first place?276
In the Criminal Court system, the available sanctioning alternatives may
be analogized to "a leap between a band-aid and brain surgery."27 If some-
one misses community service mandated by the Criminal Court, a warrant is
put out for his arrest. The developers of the Community Court recognize that
an escalating system of sanctions is desirable, and they are attempting to design
graduated sanctions so that the consequences do not become too harsh too
quickly. One judge explained that "the Community Court is about filling in
the numbers two through nine. At one, nothing happens to the defendant. At
ten, the defendant spends a short time in jail."2" 8 To some extent this prob-
lem has already been addressed, because community service options are
designed to encompass varying degrees of supervision in order to "guard
against a jail-bound population."279
F. Displacement
One measure of the Community Court's success will be the change, if any,
in the number of vendors in the Times Square Area. If the court is successful
over time, peddlers will learn that if arrested they will have to perform com-
munity service, unlike their counterparts in other areas of the city. As a result,
they will not come back to the midtown area. Success, as measured by the
number of vendors remaining in the Times Square Area, can mean only one
of two things: Either the vendors have been displaced from midtown and have
moved into the surrounding areas, or the total number of vendors in the city
has decreased. If the former proves true, the success of the Community Court
would be illusory. Inevitably, critics would conclude that the Times Square
Area merchants and special interests were able "to buy" cleaner, safer streets.
Ideally, the Community Court's presence would wholly eradicate, not merely
relocate, the illegal vendors. It is more probable, however, that the court will
push the vendors out of its immediate catchment area and into other areas of
the city.
276. Telephone Interview with John Feinblatt, supra note 10; see supra note 210 and accompanying
text.
277. Interview with Judge Robert G.M. Keating, supra note 5.
278. Id.
279. Interview with John Feinblatt, supra note 181.
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G. Costs
There are many costs associated with the move from a centralized to a
decentralized judicial system, and the allocation and control of scarce resources
is at the heart of the debate. It is difficult to calculate accurately the costs of
reform. First, economies of scale are lost in some contexts, for the Community
Court has necessitated the duplication of existing facilities and procedures. For
example, in the Criminal Court at 100 Centre Street, just one metal detector
and one interpreter serve all those who enter the system. Although the Com-
munity Court serves a much smaller population, these facilities had to be
duplicated. By one estimation, these two necessities alone will cost in excess
of $1 million per year.280 Not all resources will have to be duplicated, how-
ever. Because the Community Court has assumed some of the Criminal Court's
caseload, other costs will not increase significantly. For example, part of the
section downtown will be closed, and guards and other workers can be relocat-
ed to the Community Court.
Some of the Community Court's opponents claim that its "costs are greatly
understated."28 ' In addition to the duplication of some resources, there are
the basic costs of establishing a new structure, design, and process. These
costs might include not only an increase in the criminal justice system's actual
budget, but also the opportunity cost of using the building, which belongs to
the City. Furthermore, the Criminal Court is a nearly twenty-four hour a day
business. In contrast, because the Community Court will be open only during
daytime hours, if an offender has to be held overnight because the court is
unable to complete processing of all cases in a given day, the staff of the court
will have to be paid overtime.282 In comparison, when an offender must be
held at the Criminal Court, the incoming shift of court staff takes over at no
additional cost. Devising the community service sanctions also increases costs;
staff and supervisors must be available to coordinate, manage, schedule, and
direct the work of each offender given community service.
An examination of the allocation of resources is central to any assessment
280. Interview with Paul Shechtman, supra note 128.
281. Id.
282. After eight weeks of the Community Court's operation, the court had reached every case on its
docket every day. Interview with John Feinblatt, supra note 171. As the court continues to operate, it will
begin to expand its caseload (for example, by taking arrests from both the 10th Precinct and the Port
Authority) so that the court's ability to complete its docket each day may become a more realistic concern
in the future.
It has been noted that even the Criminal Court is susceptible to overload. Thus, it too may have to
pay overtime to staff members when it is not able to complete necessary arraignments. In 1989, Matthew
Crosson, then-Chief Administrator of State Courts, noted that "[b]ecause of the increased volume of arrests,
the [criminal] court has to constantly add extra arraignment parts .... These parts frequently are either
conducted at night or they go into the night hours, and the result is that we pay overtime to the non-judicial
staff." Survey: Meager Court Facilities are No. I Problem; Q & A: OCA Chief Matthew Crosson,
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of the Community Court. Yet, a rigorous accounting of the increased costs is
likely to come only at high political cost. In fact, in taking into account the
costs of the Community Court, one critic called the project a "bloody waste
of money."213 We must choose to invest our scarce resources in the most
cost-efficient system that meets reasonable standards for the administration of
justice. By most accounts, the present system does not achieve the latter of
these goals. The Criminal Court is able to manage an enormous caseload, yet
it does not necessarily do much with the cases that pass through it.2 In the
universe of limited resources, quality-of-life crimes are traditionally the last
to be addressed. Some judges have expressed their belief that this neglect of
low-level offenders may be counterproductive because such offenders may be
precisely those whose lives can be changed for the better.285 Most insiders
likely would contend that the present system does not help these individuals
but rather neglects them until they create bigger and more serious problems
for society as felony offenders.2"6 Such an approach, if true, is "neither
humane, nor cost effective. "287
A consideration of cost must also question the separateness of the Commu-
nity Court itself. Why were the changes not implemented in the centralized
system downtown? The court's special status and location reduce its cost
effectiveness. In fact, Paul Shechtman has noted that some programs exist
downtown already. For example, the Parks Department and the Transit Agency
both provide work for community service sanctions at the present time.
Nonetheless, the developers of the Community Court apparently think it would
be too difficult to launch such a broad based experiment within the confines
of the present system.
Many of the main players involved in the planning of the Community Court
say that the need for space was a key reason for creating the new court in a
separate facility.28 In addition, some observers point out that proximity is
critical to the success of a community service program and that ideally it
should be located in a space contiguous to the courtroom. At 100 Centre
Street, the community service office is located on the second floor of the
building.289 As one judge observed, "to get them into the program, you've
got to get them to the program.""29 One of the Community Court's primary
283. Interview with Paul Shechtman, supra note 128.
284. Even the Criminal Court's "efficiency" has been disputed. See Subin, supra note 2.
285. Interview with Judge Robert G.M. Keating, supra note 5. At least one observer has suggested
a radically different solution to the court's failure. He proposes to divert the majority of the Criminal
Court's caseload to noncriminal channels, eliminate the court in toto, and focus the criminal justice system
on attempting to cope with the most serious crimes. Subin, supra note 2, at 2.
286. Interview with Judge Robert G.M. Keating, supra note 5.
287. Id.
288. Interview with Judge Charles Solomon, supra note 127.
289. Id.
290. Interview with Judge Robert G.M. Keating, supra note 5.
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opponents, however, claims that the reason for the creation of a wholly
separate facility cannot be the lack of space in the facility at 100 Centre Street
since there are three rooms that remain unoccupied in the Criminal Court.291
Another important factor is the amount of savings in the time that it takes
to process a case from arrest to arraignment. In the past, summary arrestees
in Times Square were taken downtown for processing and often held overnight
for arraignment.292 The Community Court shortens the time from arrest to
arraignment, because defendants no longer have to be moved downtown to be
processed. This saves the city the expense of transporting and holding summa-
ry arrest offenders. Furthermore, the time saved by police officers allows them
to return to the streets more quickly.293 A significant number of vendors,
however, are given DATs and are not held until arraignment. In fact, the DAT
Express program applies to vendors and is already in place in both the Mid-
town North and South precincts.2 94 Therefore, the extent to which the Com-
munity Court can shorten the process for unlicensed vending cases will be
limited given the time-saving techniques already in place for this group of
offenders.
V. CONCLUSION
The Midtown Community Court experiment demonstrates New York's
position as a national leader in urban court reform. Despite apparent differenc-
es between criminal justice practices in New York and practices in other cities,
this experimental project is instructive and relevant for other urban courts.
Although there are differences among urban courts, "[t]he structural similari-
ties among all local American criminal courts are so strong that it is accurate
to speak of 'the urban criminal court' as a distinct institutional form."295
Innovations in New York City courts in particular deserve close attention,
because in the past New York has served as the model for criminal justice
291. Interview with Paul Shechtman, supra note 128.
292. Spotlight on Justice in limes Square, supra note 156.
293. Id.
294. Interview with Deirdre Newton, supra note 97.
295. McDONALD, supra note 199, at 3. While meaningful differences may exist between upper and
lower courts, and between rural and city courts, most urban courts employ similar schemes of criminal
procedure:
Police make arrests; district attorneys' office charge defendants and prosecute them on behalf
of the public and the state; defense attorneys represent defendants. Judges manage the adjudica-
tion process, take convictions, and pass sentences. And ... plea bargaining practices found in
New York City courts resemble those found elsewhere. . . . In short, New York's courts are





practices nationwide.296 The Community Court may represent the beginnings
of a major shift away from centralized court administration, which has domi-
nated the thinking of court administrators in New York and other cities, toward
the localization of lower courts.
Although this Note considers the workings of the Midtown Community
Court generally, its conclusions are, in some ways, limited to the context of
unlicensed vendors. The Community Court's jurisdiction sweeps across all
misdemeanors committed in the Times Square Area, and unlicensed vendors
are caught in this net in significant numbers. Vendors, however, are perhaps
the defendants least likely to react positively to the Community Court's novel
approach. The Community Court's most innovative sanctions, including
rehabilitation programs and counseling, do not ameliorate or even address the
specific problems that most vendors face.297
A major motivation behind the development of the Community Court is
sheer dissatisfaction with the present system,298 for "the New York City
Criminal Court is not performing the functions of a criminal court-indeed,
it is not performing much of a function at all."299 In the final analysis, the
Community Court is a welcome attempt to improve the substance and proce-
dure of criminal justice administration at the Criminal Court. One Criminal
Court judge stated that it is "hard to imagine a scenario in which the results
[of the Community Court] will be worse" than the results of the Criminal
Court.3" The developers of the Community Court have seized an opportunity
to meet a call for change. At a minimum, the development of the Community
Court focuses attention on much neglected, quality-of-life crimes and their
impact on neighborhood communities, and demonstrates that our society does
not have to be satisfied with the "turnstile" system of justice that exists in the
New York Criminal Court.
296. Id. New York court innovations include Desk Appearance Tickets, ROR in lieu of bail, and the
pretrial diversion of youthful offenders. Id. at 3-4. The public and the national news media have already
begun to take an interest in the Community Court. See, e.g., NBC Nightly News with Tom Brokaw (NBC
television broadcast, Brian Williams, reporter, Dec. 16, 1993).
297. The Community Court has, however, taken steps to meet the needs of unlicensed vendors as a
distinct group of offenders. First, the court has hired a Senegalese supervisor to assist in the supervision
of vendors in community service projects. Second, the court has instituted English as a Second Language
classes that are available to vendors. See supra text accompanying note 198. Third, the court expects to
institute a jobs program. This program will not only employ people at the courthouse and pay them
minimum wage, but it will also provide "job readiness" training with instruction in interview skills and
rdsumd writing. Telephone interview with John Feinblatt, supra note 10.
298. For further discussion and another proposal for change, see Subin, supra note 2.
299. Id. at 2.
300. Interview with Judge Robert G.M. Keating, supra note 5.

